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Abstract
Information plays an important role in nancial markets. In this dissertation,
rst, we consider how traders choose dierent information. Second, we ask when
traders acquire information under competition. Finally, we analyze how ambiguous
information aects traders' incentives to trade and reveal their private information.
There is information not only about the payo but also concerning the supply and
demand of an asset. In Chapter 1, we study how traders choose to process dierent
information while asset prices are conveying some information. We show that traders
decide to process dierent types of information depends on their initial belief and
the informativeness of asset prices. In particular, when the return to each type of
information is increasing, traders choose to learn only one type of information. Those
who have more precise initial belief about the asset payo (supply) choose to learn
more about the asset payo (supply).
In Chapter 2, we study when traders decide to acquire information under compe-
tition. Traders consider two eects of competition in information acquisition: one is
that an informed trader's protability is aected by the presence of another informed
trader, the other is the spillover of the information from the informed trader to the
uninformed. We show that, when the former eect dominates, then traders tend
to acquire information earlier. If the otherwise, then traders tend to delay their
information acquisition.
In Chapter 3, we study traders' behavior when information is ambiguous, which
gives rise to multiple probability models to describe uncertainty. We demonstrate that
ambiguity will reduce traders' incentive to trade and reveal their private information.
When there is a moderate level of ambiguity, informed traders start to trade randomly,
whereas they trade for sure when there is no or a little uncertainty. When ambiguity
is suciently large, informed traders choose not to trade any more, and no additional
information will be revealed in the market.
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Introduction
Financial markets are of great importance in the economy. People trade assets and
commodities in various nancial markets. There is a large amount of uncertainty
involved in trading activities. Therefore, information comes into play. It helps traders
to reduce uncertainty and to make sensible trading decisions. Dierent information
possessed by traders also motivates them to trade with each other and to share their
perceived risk.
There are numerous information sources. For example, to predict the movement of
the S&P 500 index, investors can check the publicly available macroeconomic statistics
and search for analysts' reports online. Speculators track investor sentiment in
various media and statistics. Moreover, economists believe that traders form rational
expectations. That is, asset prices reect information about the fundamentals of
the asset and of the economy; traders understand this relationship and can infer
information from the asset prices.
The information is revealed through trading activities. Traders are not born with
information. In the rst place, they have to collect and process dierent items of
information and then decide whether to engage in trading, so that information ows
in nancial markets. This dissertation aims to address the following issues regarding
the role of information and traders' strategic interactions in the nancial markets
from dierent perspectives. First, we study how traders choose their information
when they can infer some information through price. Second, we consider the timing
of information acquisition when traders know that the trading activities of others
reveal information. In addition, we investigate traders' behavior and how information
revelation is aected when information is ambiguous. Ambiguity gives rise to multiple
probability models to describe uncertainty.
Traders have to choose which information to process when they are faced with too
much information and a limited capability to handle it. There are multiple sources of
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freely available information. We categorize the relevant information into two types:
One is payo information about the nal payo of the asset, e.g. nancial reports,
sales and revenue forecasts, analysts' reports. The other is supply information that
signals the supply and demand from investors' liquidity motives, e.g. condence and
sentiment of investors, and exogenous liquidity shocks. However, there are limits
and constraints on the human cognitive capability to process a large amount of
information. The time and eort devoted to processing information are dubbed
attention. A rational trader needs to decide how to allocate attention to dierent
types of information.
Asset prices convey some information obtained by other traders. However, the
price is also noisy, and it does not fully reveal the fundamental information. Therefore,
in Chapter 1, we consider a model of an asset market where agents can choose their
information. There are multiple rational expectation equilibria, which are solved
explicitly, in an asset market where there are both private signals on payo and
supply information. Traders choose their private signals before the asset market
opens. We point out the strategic interaction in attention allocation and provide
sucient conditions to guarantee the existence of equilibrium in general. There can
be multiple overall equilibria in the game of attention allocation due to the multiplicity
of equilibria in the asset market.
In particular, if information entropy measures information processing capacity,
then agents allocate their attention to only one type of information because of increas-
ing return to each type of information. We show that heterogeneity in the precisions
of prior information can lead to a pattern of specialization. Traders with high initial
prior precision about payo information, i.e. with a comparative advantage in the
payo information, will choose to learn the payo signals, while traders with low
initial prior precision about payo information have a comparative advantage in the
supply information, and they will choose to learn the supply signals. Moreover, the
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payo informativeness of the asset prices is higher (lower) in an equilibrium where
fewer (more) agents are choosing to learn the payo signals.
Then, we consider the time dimension of information acquisition and the fact that
traders are not restricted to acquiring information at a specic time but can choose
any time to obtain information. A trader's incentive can change over time. It depends
on the evolution of market conditions and traders' prior knowledge enabling them to
evaluate the benet against the cost of acquiring information. For example, when the
price of gold is rising, investors would like to investigate the potential protability of
gold-mining companies and decide whether to purchase their stocks.
When multiple traders become informed, the timing of their information acqui-
sition is further complicated by competition. On the one hand, information reduces
uncertainty and increases informed traders' expected prot. This is especially true
when one trader acquires information earlier than the other. The rst informed trader
can enjoy an informational advantage and experience reduced competition in trading
with other traders so that she can trade aggressively and earn more expected prots.
On the other hand, while one trader pays the cost of acquiring information, some
information can be disclosed to another trader who does not need to pay a penny.
Uninformed traders can wait for free access to the information for which other traders
have paid.
In Chapter 2, we examine an information acquisition timing game in the assets
market. The market conditions, or the asset prices, uctuate driven by public
information and two traders decide when to acquire information on the asset payo.
Motivated by the trade-os mentioned above, two specic externalities are present:
trading externality, i.e. an informed trader's trading volume and protability being
aected by the presence of another informed trader, and information externality, i.e.
the spillover of the information from the informed trader to the uninformed trader.
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The former leads to the rst-mover advantage or incentive for traders to acquire
information earlier, and the latter gives rise to the second-mover advantage. There-
fore, the nature of the timing game depends on the relative strength of the two
externalities: if the rst-mover advantage dominates, then the game of information
acquisition timing is a preemption game; if the second-mover advantage dominates,
then this game is a war of attrition. Consequently, compared to the timing decision on
the information acquisition of only one trader, traders always acquire information later
when the timing game is a war of attrition. However, whether or not traders acquire
information earlier in a preemption game depends on the information externality.
Although traders can obtain a signicant amount of information, the quality of
the information is sometimes dicult to assess. We proceed to examine the eect of
ambiguous information on trading behavior and information revelation. We say the
information is ambiguous if there is no single probability distribution to describe the
uncertainty. The situation of lacking knowledge of a unique probability distribution is
reminiscent of the celebrated Ellsberg (1961) paradox. When agents choose between
bets based on draws from an urn with a known distribution of balls of dierent colors
and an urn with an unknown distribution, they exhibit ambiguity aversion, i.e. they
are more likely to choose bets with known odds over the bets with unknown odds on
the same stakes.
Ambiguity aversion can aect the incentives and the decisions of both traders and
market makers because trading an asset is betting on its valuation. In Chapter 3,
we study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity averse traders and market
maker where the market maker posts bid and ask prices and traders, who may be
informed or uninformed, arrive sequentially and decide whether or not to trade.
Ambiguity can be a source of bid-ask spread in the sense that it increases if the
belief in the market becomes more ambiguous.
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In addition, there could be informational cascades, i.e. traders choose the same
action sequentially regardless of their private information. This situation occurs
when public beliefs are suciently ambiguous, due to the agents' aversion to uncer-
tainty. Whenever there are informational cascades, prices fail to incorporate private
information and the bid-ask spreads will not converge to the true value. Moreover,
when private signals are ambiguous, trading activities that reveal the information
imperfectly will inject ambiguity into the public beliefs. Therefore, the asset market
will produce a situation that is arbitrarily close to an informational cascade even
though it started out with little ambiguity at the beginning.
Unlike trading without ambiguity, where there is always some equilibrium with
pure trading strategies, the trading game under ambiguity requires the informed
traders to play mixed trading strategies to guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
Because informed traders employ mixed trading strategies, and they may not trade,
sometimes no-trade can also be informative about the true value of the asset. For
example, this is the situation when signals are asymmetric: no news is bad (good)
news in the market when a bad signal is less (more) informative than a good signal.
In short, we explore the role of information and traders' strategic interaction in
the nancial markets from dierent perspectives. The remaining chapters of the
dissertation contain an in-depth discussion of these topics in the following order.
First, traders choose their information in the sense that they allocate their attention
to dierent types of information. Second, traders time their information acquisition
when they are competing and some information is revealed in the activity of others.
Finally, we see that ambiguity aversion aects the incentives for agents to trade and
to reveal their private information in the asset market.
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Chapter 1
Strategic Attention Allocation in the
Asset Market
1.1 Introduction
Information plays an important role in the nancial markets. There are numerous
information sources, and plenty of information is freely available in the information
era. For example, to predict the movement of S&P 500 index, investors can check
the publicly available macroeconomic statistics and search for analyst reports on-
line. Speculators trace the investor's sentiment from various media. Recently, some
start-ups provide services to institutional investors based on their analysis of the
alternative data such as social media data, online search trend, etc. Menkho
(2010) analyzes survey data from 692 fund managers in ve countries and nds that
fund managers make their decision on fundamental analysis, technical analysis, and
order ows.
We can categorize the relevant information into dierent types for a specic asset
traded in the market. One type of the informationthe payo informationis about
the fundamental value or nal payo of the asset. Examples of such information
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can be nancial reports, sales and revenue forecasts, analyst reports, etc. Another
type of informationthe supply informationsignals the excessive supply or demand
from investors' liquidity motives. This type of information includes condence and
sentiment of investors, technical analysis of short-term price movements, exogenous
liquidity shocks, and so forth, which is irrelevant to the fundamental value of the
asset but aects investors' trading decision and the supply and demand of the asset.
Empirical studies reveal that asset prices and returns are aected by and reect
dierent information. The classical study of Fama and French (1992) shows that ac-
counting information such as book-to-market ratio can predict cross-sectional returns.
Non-fundamental information also has an inuence on the asset prices and returns.
Baker and Wurgler (2006) nd that investor sentiment can explain some dierence in
the cross-sectional returns as well. Antweiler and Frank (2004) show that messages
on the internet can predict the volatility of stock price.
Investors are not born with information but they have to collect and process
dierent information. The information gathered and processed by the investors are
manifested in their investment strategies and styles. Investors whose strategy based
on fundamental analysis have to acquire payo information such as accounting report,
while those who are using technical analysis to formulate their investment strategy
pay more attention to supply information such as the pattern of price movements.
Evidence shows that investors employ dierent investment strategies and styles, which
indirectly indicates that investors acquire dierent types of information. Farboodi and
Veldkamp (2016) reveal that some hedge fund managers rely on fundamental analysis
and others use quantitative strategies employing market transaction data.1 Although
1Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016) use the Lipper TASS Database, which provides data on
performance and other characteristics of 7,500 actively reporting hedge funds and 11,000 funds that
are liquidated or stopped reporting. In their classication, a fund is fundamental if its strategy
is explicitly based on fundamental analysis or upon the discretion of the manager; and a fund is
quantitative if it deploys a technical and/or algorithmic strategy.
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the importance of fundamental analysis is undeniable, Taylor and Allen (1992) report
that over 90% of foreign exchange traders use some non-fundamental analysis.
There are limits and constraints of human cognitive capability to process a large
amount of information, not to mention the pecuniary cost of acquiring information.
With limited time and eort, investors can focus on collecting data only from some
of the information sources, instead of collecting information from all available infor-
mation. A rational trader needs to decide how to allocate her time and eort on
dierent types of information. The time and eort devoted to processing information
are dubbed attention.
On one hand, each trader is faced with too much available information but
constrained with limited attention. On the other hand, rational traders should expect
that asset prices convey some information obtained by other traders in the market
equilibrium. But the price is also noisy, it is not fully revealing the fundamental
information. As argued in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), if the price is fully revealing
all the information relevant to the asset fundamental, then traders will not have the
incentive to acquire information. Larcker and Lys (1987) document that some risk
arbitrageurs have superior information to predict the success of some events, such as
mergers, tender oers, etc., and they earn a substantial excess return on their trading
activities. Similar to that, attention is a scarce resource when the price is not fully
revealing. Given that each trader anticipates information acquired by other traders
reected in publicly observable asset prices, how should a trader allocate her attention
to acquire dierent types of information?
To explore this question, we consider a model of an asset market where agents can
choose their information. First, traders choose to allocate their attention between
two types of information, and then the asset market is open and they trade. Indi-
vidual traders exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and random variables
are normally distributed. This CARA-normal rational expectation framework (see
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Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Verrecchia 1982; Admati 1985) is adopted to study
the asset market where traders have dierential information. Rational expectation
equilibrium (REE) prices aggregate private information. In particular, the asset
market model is built on that of Ganguli and Yang (2009), where additional private
information on the net supply of the asset is allowed. Similar to their results, there
could be multiple partially-revealing rational expectation equilibria (pr-REE) in the
asset market. When agents have only private signals on the supply information, there
can be an equilibrium where the asset price is purely noisy, not reecting any payo
information.
In the rst stage, traders choose to allocate attention among dierent types of
information. To capture individual's limitation of information processing capacity,
an information constraint is considered. Specically, individuals choose how much
attention they should allocate to reduce the uncertainty about payo and supply
information constrained by their information capacity.
The attention allocation problem in the rst stage is strategic to the traders.
Each trader anticipates that the asset price is reecting what the average trader
knows in an REE. However, such average is determined by the prole of individual
strategies to allocate attention. Therefore, this formulation makes the rst-stage
problem an aggregative game, where their expected utility depends only on their own
action and the aggregation of all individual choices. Some authors, e.g. Schmeidler
(1973), Mas-Colell (1984), and Rath (1992), have shown that there exist pure strategy
Nash equilibria in this type of games. However, the game of attention allocation
violates some the assumptions of a standard aggregative game, therefore the existence
of equilibrium requires additional conditions. We give some sucient condition to
guarantee the existence of equilibrium in general. There can be multiple overall
equilibria in the game of attention allocation due to the multiplicity of equilibria in
the asset market.
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If private signals are exogenously given, the asset price is purely noisy in one
of the possible equilibria when agents only have signals on the supply information.
However, when agents allocate their attention, the asset price cannot be purely noisy
even though it is the case that all agents choose to only process the supply information.
We further consider a specic information processing capacity measure, informa-
tion entropy, introduced by Sims (2003) in the economic literature from information
theory (e.g. Shannon 1948; Khinchin 2013). Since information has increasing returns
to its scale under the information entropy, traders specialize, learning either the payo
signals or the supply signals only. There can exist equilibrium where all the traders
choose to learn the same type information.
If traders are dierent and some have comparative advantages in dierent types
of information; specically, they are heterogeneous in their prior precisions of payo
information, then a pattern of specialization may emerge in equilibrium. Traders
with high initial prior precision about payo information, i.e. with the comparative
advantage in the payo information, will choose to learn the payo signals, while
traders with low initial prior precision about payo information have comparative
advantage in the supply information, and they will choose to learn the supply signals.
Some empirical facts suggestively support our result. The data in Farboodi
and Veldkamp (2016) shows that investment styles of the hedge funds are typically
specialized: half of the asset is managed by funds that specialize in either fundamental
analysis or quantitative analysis over the entire period from 1994 to 2016. Menkho
(2010) documents that smaller funds rely on technical analysis more heavily than
larger funds, which reects the dierentials in capability or cost for acquiring fun-
damental information as he argues. If we look at the statistics on retail investors
who are considered disadvantageous in the fundamental information, Homann and
Shefrin (2014) reveal that only 20% of them uses fundamental analysis.2
2Homann and Shefrin (2014) use a data set from a discount online broker in the Netherlands
from 2000 to 2006.
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If there exist two equilibria in the same economy, then they have dierent compara-
tive statics, changing in the dierent directions with respect to the same change in the
parameter. In one equilibrium, the payo informativeness of the price is increasing
in the agent's information capacity and prior precisions but decreasing in the risk
aversion. However, in another equilibrium, the payo informativeness of the price
changes in the opposite direction with respect to the same change in the parameters.
Related Literature
Ganguli and Yang (2009) rst consider payo and supply signals in an REE frame-
work. They show that there are multiple REE with partially revealing prices. The
asset market model in this paper closely follows theirs. They consider agents with
identical preference and two types, informed and uninformed, and study the costly
information acquisition with xed signal precisions in such environment. We extend
their model where agents are allowed to have dierent preferences and arbitrary
precisions of signals so that we can analyze the problem of how agents allocate
attention and choose signal precisions.
There are some studies on the entropy-type information constraint and attention
allocation in an REE framework. For example, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009) and Mondria (2010) consider a multi-asset environment and study how agents
allocate their attention to the fundamental information of dierent assets. In partic-
ular, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) explain that home investors specialize
to learn about home asset and invest more heavily on home asset because they
have an initial information advantage, a higher prior precision of returns, on the
home asset. Similarly, in our model, traders with higher initial precision about
fundamental value will choose to learn the fundamental signals, although our paper
studies how agents allocate attention to dierent types of information, fundamental
and non-fundamental.
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The model of Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016) is the closest to ours in spirit. They
also consider attention allocation to dierent types of information, though, in an
overlapping generation version of REE. They want to explain the the increasing
information capacity lead to the switching of hedge fund styles from fundamental
analysis to quantitative analysis. For this purpose, they assume a specic liquidity
shock so that there is a unique equilibrium and they focus on a quadratic information
constraint. Despite the dierence in modeling choices, one similar result between
their study and ours stands out: the individual problem of maximizing the expected
utility is equivalent to maximize the posterior precision of the asset payo.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 1.2 describes the model of an
asset market where there are both payo and supply signals. We then consider the
equilibrium of attention allocation in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 analyzes the the model
in which the information capacity is measured by information entropy. Section 1.5
discuss the existence of equilibrium in the general model. Section 1.6 concludes and
discusses implications of the model. All the proofs are in the Appendix to Chapter 1.
1.2 The Asset Market with Payo and Supply Sig-
nals
We begin with the description of the asset market with heterogeneous agents and
arbitrary parameters of the signal structure. It extends the asset market model of
Ganguli and Yang (2009) with payo and supply signals. There is a risk-free asset, a
risky asset, and a continuum of agents with measure one.3 The asset market model
is static: The agents observe their private signals, choose portfolios, and then they
consume the nal wealth.




The agents, denoted by a ∈ [0, 1], are endowed with the same initial wealth W . The
initial wealth can be considered as holding risk-free bond with gross return R, which
serves as the numeraire in the economy. The payo θ̃ of the risky asset is random.
Let qa be the quantity of the risky asset held by an agent a and p̃ be the price of the
risky asset. The nal wealth of the agent is
WR + qa(θ̃ − p̃R). (1.2.1)
The agent's objective is to maximize the expected utility of the nal wealth. Each
agent has a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) and their risk aversion λa may dier from each other. That is,
the vNM utility function for agent a has the form
ua(w) = −e−λaw. (1.2.2)
Prior Information on the Payo and Supply
Each agent a ∈ [0, 1] has a prior belief that the payo θ̃ follows the normal distribution
N(θ̄,Θa). In the standard rational expectation framework, agents are assumed to
have the same prior. However, with some departure from the standard common prior
assumption, agents are also allowed to dier in the variance Θa of their prior belief
about the asset payo. Agents may dier in condence, experience, or expertise.
For example, if agents use dierent estimators, simple or sophisticated, then they
will have dierent standard errors even though agents are faced with the same data a
priori. Kandel and Pearson (1995) provide empirical evidence to support that traders
interpret public data dierently.
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The net supply ζ̃ of the risky asset is also random; such randomness is due to the
existence of liquidity traders who trade the asset for exogenous reasons. The noisy
supply ζ̃ is also normally distributed and agents share the same mean ζ̄ but may dier
in the variance Za in their prior beliefs, i.e. ζ̃ ∼ N(ζ̄ ,Za) for agent a ∈ [0, 1]. We
often use on the precisions, the inverse of variances, of the prior information about
payo and supply, i.e. πθ,a = Θ
−1
a and πζ,a = Z
−1
a , which turns out more convenient
to work with in the calculation.
The Payo and Supply Signals
Each agent a can observe two private signals, s̃a and z̃a, on the asset payo and noisy
supply, respectively. Specically, the signals that each agent observes when asset
market opens are assumed to be of the following form,
s̃a = θ̃ + ε̃a, ε̃a ∼ N (0, Ea) , (1.2.3)
z̃a = ζ̃ + ξ̃a, ξ̃a ∼ N (0,Xa) , (1.2.4)
where
(
θ̃, ζ̃, (ε̃a, ξ̃a)a∈[0,1]
)
are mutually independent. Notice that the private signals
have the same structure among agents, however, the variances, Ea and Xa, of the
noise terms, ε̃a and ξ̃a, can vary by agents. In this section, the signal structure is
given and dierences in signal variances are due to the fact the individual agents have
diversied information sources. When we analyze the attention allocation problem in
Section 1.3, agents can choose these parameters, as collecting their own information,
to determine their signal structures. The precisions of signals are σθ,a = E−1a and
σζ,a = X−1a .
We assume that the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) hold for this economy
with a continuum of agents by convention. Let {νa}a∈[0,1] be a process of independent
14




νada = 0 almost surely.
4
The economy can be described as a measurable function (λ·, πθ,·, πζ,·, σθ,·, σζ,·) :
[0, 1] → R5+, where λa, πθ,a, πζ,a, σθ,a, and σζ,a are the risk aversion, prior precisions
of the payo and supply information, precisions of the payo and supply signals,
respectively, of agent a. For a complete description of priors and signals, we follow
conventions when precisions of prior beliefs or signals are equal to zero: If either
πθ,a = 0 or πζ,a = 0, then the agent a has an improper prior of either payo or supply
information; if either σθ,a = 0 or σζ,a = 0, then the agent a is not observing either a
payo signal or a supply signal.
1.2.1 Rational Expectation Equilibrium
As argued in the earlier literature, e.g. Hellwig (1980), because individual agent's
demand for asset reects her private information, the asset price that clears the
market has to be a function of private information (sa, za)a∈[0,1] of all agents. The
asset price typically provides additional information to each agent beyond their own
information. The agents know the price function and understand the actual joint
distribution of private signals and the underlying aggregate random variables in
equilibrium. Therefore, each agent a exploits the information contained in the asset
price and takes expectation conditional on her private signals, sa and za, and the










4Doob (1937) and Judd (1985) point out the issue of measurability of the process (x̃a)a∈[0,1].
Other authors (e.g. Admati, 1985; Vives, 2010) argue potential resolutions to this technical issue.
Think that the integral is approximated by the average of discrete random variables and the average
converges by the usually strong law of large number. The integral is then dened as a limit when
number of discrete random variables increases. See also Sun (2006).
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Hellwig (1980) considers an asset market with nite numbers of agents where the
equilibrium price linearly depends on all the private signals. The price has two roles:
one is to clear the market, and the other is to convey information of all other agents.
The asset demand of each agent depends on her own private signals and market
clearing equation make the price an implicit function of all agents' private signals.
From each agent's perspective, the price contains information beyond her own signals
and rational agents understand the joint distribution of private signals and price.
Hellwig also argues that, if the number of agents grows to innity, the price converges
to a function that only depends on the aggregate shocks, namely, θ̃ and ζ̃. In a large
economy, Admati (1985) shows the existence of an equilibrium price function that
depends on the aggregate shocks where idiosyncratic shocks are aggregated out by
SLLN.
Denote qa(sa, za, p) the asset demand function of agent a who observes signals sa
and za and price p, resulting from maximization of her expected utility (2.2.4). Then
the following denition of an equilibrium in the asset market is standard.
Denition 1.2.1. A rational expectation equilibrium (REE) in the asset market
consists of an asset price p̃ and asset demand functions {qa(s̃a, z̃a, p̃)}a∈[0,1] such that:
(i) p̃ is (θ̃, ζ̃) measurable,
(ii) portfolios are optimally chosen












(iii) asset market clears, i.e. equation
∫ 1
0
qa(s̃a, z̃a, p̃)da = ζ̃ (1.2.7)
holds almost surely.
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The Partially-Revealing Rational Expectation Equilibrium







with c > 0 and D ≥ 0.5 The information of the payo value θ̃ is revealed in the
price function when D > 0, though it is also confounded by the noisy supply ζ̃. Since
the coecient of ζ̃ is normalized to unit, the coecient D of θ̃ is considered as the
(relative) payo informativeness of the price function. Larger D indicates that price
is more responsive to the change in the payo information. As a special case, the
REE can be purely noisy if D = 0 and the price is not revealing any information
about the payo of the asset.
Before proceeding further, boundedness assumptions are imposed so that the key
integrals will be well-dened. First, assume that there exist two numbers β and γ
such that 0 < β < γ < ∞ and β ≤ λa ≤ γ for almost every a ∈ [0, 1]. Second, πθ,a,









are well-dened. Moreover, for a strictly positive measure of agents, they have either
σθ,a > 0 or σζ,a > 0 so that at least one of the aggregates Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ must be strictly
positive. Let Π̂θ =
∫ 1
0
λ−1a πθ,ada and Π̂ζ =
∫ 1
0
λ−1a πζ,ada. The next proposition shows
how these aggregates determine the existence of equilibria in the asset market.




with B > 0 and
C > 0. The price is revealing the payo information because B > 0, but it is only partially revealing
due to that C > 0. Then, we can get the equivalent expression (1.2.8) of price function by letting
c = C/R, x = A/C, and D = B/C.
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Theorem 1.2.1. If 0 < Σ̂θΣ̂ζ < 1/4, then there exist two pr-REE with the asset




where D solves the quadratic equation
Σ̂ζD














Remark 1.2.1. When Σ̂θΣ̂ζ = 1/4, there exists only one pr-REE with D = 1/2Σ̂ζ .
When Σ̂ζ = 0, there exists one pr-REE with D = Σ̂θ. When Σ̂θ = 0, there exist two
pr-REE with D = 0 or D = 1/Σ̂ζ .
Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ are the average of signal precisions weighted by risk tolerance, i.e. the
inverse of risk aversion. Such a pr-REE exists only when
Σ̂θΣ̂ζ ≤ 1/4. (1.2.14)
This is equivalent to a joint restriction on the magnitude of two aggregates. It requires
that the average signal precisions small enough, i.e. the signals are noisy enough on
average, or agents are suciently risk averse to prevent agents to trade too much to
reveal a large amount of information.
Note that, when 0 < Σ̂θΣ̂ζ < 1/4, the quadratic equation (1.2.11) has two positive















Recall the Equation (1.2.9), Σ̂θ is the average of precisions of payo signals
weighted by the risk tolerance, so it can be considered as a measurement of the
average payo information in the market. DGS is increasing in Σ̂θ, which means that
the payo informativeness of the price increases as the average payo information
increases in a GS equilibrium. Moreover, DGS = 0 when Σ̂θ = 0. The GS equilibrium
reduces to a pn-REE when no individual has any payo signals. Note that when
Σ̂ζ = 0, the Equation (1.2.11) is reduced to a linear equation and there is a unique
positive solution Σ̂θ and it is a GS equilibrium since limΣ̂ζ→0D
GS = Σ̂θ.
The other equilibrium DCOM has dierent properties. This equilibrium is novel
in the rational expectation framework, and it appears only when there are supply
signals in the market. DCOM is decreasing in Σ̂θ, which indicates that the payo
informativeness of the price decreases as the average payo information increases in a
COM equilibrium. When Σ̂θ = 0, the only pr-REE is D
COM = 1/Σ̂ζ . When Σ̂ζ → 0,
DCOM →∞, i.e. DCOM becomes fully-revealing if there is no private signals of supply
information.
Ganguli and Yang (2009) study the information acquisition problem in an asset
market with both payo and supply signals. They show that information acquisition
exhibits strategic substitutability, which is in line with the results of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), if agents all anticipate a GS equilibrium. But information acquisition
exhibits strategic complementarity if agents coordinate on a COM equilibrium, there-
fore there can be multiple equilibria in the information market if all agent anticipate
a COM equilibrium.
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Once a value of D is solved from Equation (1.2.11), the values of c and x can also
be determined along with the given aggregates. Therefore, D itself characterizes a
pr-REE.
Mathematically, the multiplicity of pr-REE is a consequence of Σ̂ζ > 0 from
equation (1.2.11). That is, private signals on the supply information is crucial for
the multiplicity of equilibria. Intuitively, when agents have private signals on the
supply information, they can coordinate their demands through the aggregate net
supply of the asset. If they conjecture that the price has a relatively high (low)
payo-informativeness, then their demands are more (less) sensitive to the payo
signals. Then the aggregate demand is more (less) sensitive to the payo information
and hence price self-fullls to be high (low) responsive to the payo information. See
more details in Ganguli and Yang (2009).
Notice that there exists a pn-REE when the aggregation of private payo informa-
tion is zero. The existence of pn-REE is also irritating because it states that the asset
price can be irrelevant to its payo in the rational expectation and agents can learn
nothing from the asset price. If this is the case, agents will have stronger incentive
to acquire private information about the payo. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) and
Admati (1985) argue that the asset price can be purely noisy as a limiting case when
the prior variance of the supply information tends to innity, while Lintner (1969)
has a purely noisy asset price in equilibrium by explicitly assuming that agents do
not use the information from price. However, the existence of pn-REE here is under
the conditions with nite prior variance of the supply information and agents forms
rational expectations.
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1.3 The Equilibrium with Attention Allocation
The signal structure was xed in Section 1.2. Now consider the problem where the
agents have the ability to choose to learn the private signals in the sense that they can
determine how precise their private signals are. Before the asset market opens, agents
choose how much information to learn. They collect data from dierent information
sources, classify them into two types information regarding payo θ̃ and supply ζ̃.
Then each agent a synthesize the information she collects into two unbiased signals
s̃a and z̃a of two types of information. Because of the normality assumptions, agents
essentially choose the precisions of two signals. The more data collected on the payo
information and/or the supply information, the higher precisions σθ,a and/or σζ,a of
the payo signal and/or the supply signal would be. Although gathering data and
improving the precisions of the signals are free of monetary charge, it requires to
allocate attention, the agents' time and eorts to process information.
1.3.1 The Information Constraint and the Action Space
Since the signals are normally distributed, the information constraint of agent a can be
consider as a nonempty and compact subset Ka ⊆ R2+ of signal precisions (σθ,a, σζ,a).6
For example, following Sims (2003), the amount of information contained in the
signals can be quantied by using the concepts from information theory. Specically,
information entropy (Shannon, 1948) is used in the information theory to measure the
unpredictability of a random vector or the average amount of information generated
by data drawn from a distribution, and it can be derived from some reasonable axioms
(e.g. Khinchin, 2013). In general, let ω̃ be a n-dimensional random vector on some
probability space with a continuous density p(ω). The information entropy H(ω̃) is
6Assume that (0, 0) ∈ Ka and it is non-singleton.
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dened by
H(ω̃) = −E [ln p(ω)] = −
∫
p(ω) ln p(ω)dω. (1.3.1)
For example, for a normally distributed random vector ω̃ ∼ N(µ,Σ), the entropy is
H(ω̃) = −1
2
ln [(2πe)n|Σ|] , (1.3.2)
where |Σ| is the determinant of Σ. Intuitively, the larger the variance, the more
unpredictable is the random vector.
Consider two random vectors ω̃ and ν̃ having a joint density function p(ω, ν) with
marginal densities p(ω) and p(ν). Their mutual information I(ω̃; ν̃) measures the
amount of information contained in one of the random vectors through another. The
mutual information I(ω̃; ν̃) is dened as






Intuitively, mutual information measures the amount of information that ω̃ and ν̃
share: the amount of uncertainty of one random vector reduced by knowing the
other. In one extreme case, if ω̃ and ν̃ are independent, then ω̃ and ω̃|ν̃ have the
same distribution, and knowing the value of ν̃ is not helpful for reducing uncertainty
of ω̃ at all, and hence their mutual information is zero. In the other extreme case,
if two random vectors are perfectly correlated, then knowing ν̃ eliminates all the
uncertainty about ω̃, therefore, in this case, the mutual information is the information
entropy of ω̃. In addition, one can show that mutual information is symmetric, i.e.
I(ω̃; ν̃) = I(ν̃; ω̃).
Each agent is endowed with ha > 0 units of attention resources. The information
capacity constraint restricts the amount of information about (θ̃, ζ̃) contained in the
signals (s̃a, z̃a), that is, the mutual information I(θ̃, ζ̃; s̃a, z̃a) of (θ̃, ζ̃) and (s̃a, z̃a), not
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exceeding individual agent's attention resources, i.e.
I(θ̃, ζ̃; s̃a, z̃a) ≤ ha. (1.3.4)













where Ha = e
2ha . We refer Ha as the measurement of information capacity, and dene
the action space Ka of individual agent a ∈ [0, 1] by
Ka =
{
σθ,a, σζ,a ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ πθ,a + σθ,aπθ,a πζ,a + σζ,aπζ,a ≤ Ha
}
. (1.3.6)
It is evident that Ka is a compact subset in R2+.
Although Sims (2003) introduces the information constraint from the information
theory literature, in principle there could be other choices of information constraint.
One type of constraint considered by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) is an
additive constraint.
ρε,a + ρξ,a ≤ Ha. (1.3.7)
The interpretation for this constraint is that the learning technology is analogous to
a sequence of independent draws of either a payo or a supply signal with precision
δ. Each independent draw of a normally distributed signal adds precision δ to the
posterior belief. Constraining the sum of incremental precisions of the posterior belief
not exceeding Ha is equivalent to restrict the total number of draws on payo and
supply signals to be N ≤ Ha/δ.
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Figure 1.3.1: Examples of Information Constraints
Another possible information constraint studied by Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016)
is a quadratic constraint,
ρ2ε,a + χ (ρζ,a + ρξ,a)
2 ≤ Ha. (1.3.8)
This constraint captures idea that it is getting tougher and tougher to acquire more
and more precise information about a given random variable, while the total cost of
acquiring two dierent types of information is additive.
For all these popular choice of information constraints, they are essentially restrict-
ing the magnitude of signal precisions ρε,a and ρξ,a to determine the signal structure
of each agent. Therefore, in general, each agent's action space can be represented as
a constraint set of choice of signal precisions ρε,a and ρξ,a , which is also a compact
subset Ka ⊆ R2+.
The shaded area in the Figure 1.3.1 depicts some examples of the three types
of information constraint sets discussed above. Then main distinctions among them
is the convexity of the constraint sets. The entropy-type constraint has a convex
complement, while the quadratic constraint set itself is convex. Though the solutions
to constraint optimization problems also depends on the objective function, the
entropy-type constraint more likely admits corner solutions. And this is exactly the
case when later we solve the attention allocation problem where the objective function
is eectively linear.
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1.3.2 Strategic Attention Allocation
When the agents allocate their attention, the signals have not been realized. There-
fore, each agent's expectation is taken over the prior information in the stage of








WR + qa(θ̃ − p̃R)
]}]
(1.3.9)
where p̃ be a pr-REE equilibrium price function, and qa is the portfolio choice of agent
a.
Applying the law of iterated expectation to Equation (1.3.9) and after some
algebra of exponential functions and normal distributions, the indirect utility for
such agent a who takes Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ as given, expects a pr-REE D, and chooses her
information strategy σθ,a and σζ,a is
UDa
(





















are the posterior variance
and mean, respectively, of agent a.7 The choice of individual precision (σθ,a, σζ,a) of
signals aects the posterior mean and variance of individual's estimates. Moreover,
the prole of attention allocation aects the price and individual estimates through
the aggregates Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ . Hence, the attention allocation is strategic, meaning
that individual expected utility depends on the choice of others. To emphasize such




, we denote this indi-
7Explicitly,
π′a = πθ,a + σθ,a +D









2 (πζ,a + σζ,a)
]
θ̃






σθ,a, σζ,a; Σ̂θ, Σ̂ζ
)
, the expected utility corresponding to asset market
equilibrium D.
Linear Objective Function





σθ,a, σζ,a; Σ̂θ, Σ̂ζ
)
. (1.3.11)
In the following proposition, it shows that UDa depends on (σθ,a, σζ,a) only through
the posterior precision π′a, where
π′a = πθ,a + σθ,a +D
2 (πζ,a + σζ,a) , (1.3.12)
and UDa is strictly increasing in the posterior precision π
′
a. Hence, the individual
problem can be simplied to allocate attention so as to maximize her posterior
precision.




and an asset market equilibrium
D, the individual problem of attention allocation (1.3.11) is equivalent to maximize
the posterior precision (1.3.12) subject to the information constraint (σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka.
Equilibrium








σθ, σζ ; Σ̂θ, Σ̂ζ
)
, (1.3.13)
for all (σθ, σζ) ∈ Ka and almost every a ∈ [0, 1].
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The standard denition of an overall equilibrium of this game of attention al-
location is as follow: an equilibrium consists of a prole of attention allocation
(σθ,a, σζ,a)a∈[0,1], the portfolio choice (qa)a∈[0,1], and the asset price p̃ such that they
satisfy the following three conditions. First, given the information choice and the asset
price, individual portfolio choice maximizes the expected utility (2.2.4) conditional
on the realization of signals and price. Second, the asset price is set to clear the
market. Lastly, taking the aggregates of agents' information choices as given, agent
a's attention allocation σθ,a and σζ,a maximize the expected utility (2.2.23), for almost
every agent a ∈ [0, 1], conditional on prior information subject to information capacity
constraint (σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka with rational expectation of an asset market equilibrium
price p̃ and portfolio choice (qa)a∈[0,1].
The rst two conditions of the equilibrium amount to an asset market equilibrium;
and since we only consider a pr-REE, such an asset market equilibrium can be
characterized by some D that solves Equation (1.2.11). The last condition basically
requires that, given that agents anticipate a pr-REE D in the asset market, the prole
of attention allocation is a Nash equilibrium of the game of attention allocation.
Therefore, the overall equilibrium is formally dened equivalently as follow.
Denition 1.3.1. An overall equilibrium of the game of attention allocation consists
of a prole of attention allocation (σθ,a, σζ,a)a∈[0,1] and an asset market equilibrium D
such that D solves equation (1.2.11) and condition (1.3.13) holds with the expected
utility UDa corresponding to the asset equilibrium D.
Impossibility of Purely-Noisy REE under Attention Allocation
Asset price is possibly purely noisy in the asset market equilibrium when essentially
no agents have private signals on the asset payo but some agents have private signals
on the noisy supply of the asset. However, when taking into account the choice of
attention allocation, a purely noisy asset price cannot be supported in any overall
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equilibrium. Even when every agent choose to process the supply information, agents
always coordinate on a pr-REE D > 0 so that the asset price is covarying with the
asset payo.
Note that the supply information is useful to agents only when the price is
partially-revealing with D > 0. When the asset price is revealing some payo
information, agents can use the supply information combined with the asset price
to improve their estimations of the payo. However, when the asset price is purely
noisy, agents cannot improve their estimation of the payo by learning the supply.
Hence, in this case, they will choose to learn the payo directly if agents have the
option to learn some payo information. Formally, we say that an agent a can learn
the payo if there exist some (σθ,a, σζ,a) in the information constraint set Ka such
that σθ,a > 0.
8
Proposition 1.3.2. In every overall equilibrium, the asset price is not purely noisy,
i.e. D 6= 0, if and only if the set of agents who can learn the payo has a strictly
positive measure.
This is reminiscent of the paradox of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), which says
that, if information of asset payo is costly, price cannot perfectly reect that infor-
mation. However, here we establish that the asset price must reect some information
about the asset payo if this information is freely available even though the agents
have the option not to learn the payo information. The intuition is simple. Suppose
that the asset price is purely noisy, then it must be the case that essentially no
one chooses to process the payo information and has a private signal on the asset
payo. However, it is then more benecial for every agent to directly learn the payo
information to improve her prediction of the expected return. But if so, then asset
price cannot be purely noisy when some agents have private signals of the asset payo.
This reaches the contradiction.
8Conversely, an agent a cannot learn the payo if σθ,a = 0 for every (σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka.
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It turns out cumbersome to characterize the equilibria when agents are heteroge-
neous in such many dimensions and with a general information constraint. Hence, in
the following sections, the equilibria are characterized under the information entropy
constraint and agents are heterogenous in their prior beliefs.
1.4 Attention Allocation under Information Entropy
In this section, the information processing capacity is measured by information en-
tropy. Hence, we call it the game of attention allocation under information entropy.
Moreover, agents are assumed to have the same risk aversion and same information
capacity, i.e. λa = λ, Ha = H. Varying individual parameters such as risk averse λa
or information capacity Ha will only aect the asset market equilibrium D, which is
taken as the same to all the agents in equilibrium. But individual decision depends
crucially on the ratio of prior precisions between payo and supply information. If the
ratio of prior precisions, πθ,a/πζ,a, vary across agents, then individual decision is most
likely dierent from each other because the constraint sets vary across individuals.
To keep the exposition simple and clear, let us just consider one dimension of
heterogeneity among agents: the prior precision πθ,a of the payo information varies
across agents, and assume that πθ ∼ F (πθ) where F is a c.d.f. on an interval
[0,∞). This heterogeneity is sucient to generate dierence of the ratio of prior
precisions πθ,a/πζ among agents. The heterogeneity in prior precision ratio determines
a comparative advantage in information for dierent agents: Some agents have
higher precision ratio πθ,a/πζ if she has a high πθ,a, which means that a priori some
agents have superior information about the fundamental value of the asset than others,
while others are relatively more condent about their supply information.
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We rst obtain the asset market equilibrium with an arbitrary prole of attention
allocation (σθ,a, σζ,a)a∈[0,1] by using the results in the Section 1.2. Denote the average
signal precisions to be Σθ =
∫ 1
0
σθ,ada and Σζ =
∫ 1
0
σζ,ada and the average prior
precisions to be Πθ =
∫∞
0
πθdF (πθ). Then the equilibrium of the asset market can
be solved by replacing Σ̂θ = λ
−1Σθ, Σ̂ζ = λ
−1Σζ , Π̂θ = λ
−1Πθ, and Π̂ζ = λ
−1πζ in
equations (1.2.11)-(1.2.13). In particular, the equilibrium payo informativeness D
of the asset price solves
ΣζD
2 − λD + Σθ = 0. (1.4.1)
1.4.1 Specialization of Learning
Each agent faces an information constraint of the form the information entropy. The
action space of agent a is
Ka =
{
σθ,a, σζ,a ≥ 0
∣∣∣∣ πθ,a + σθ,aπθ πζ + σζ,aπζ ≤ H
}
. (1.4.2)
There are several reasons for us to choose information entropy as our primary form
of the information constraint. Besides the aforementioned axiomatic foundation, the
entropy-type constraint is widely used in the economics, econometrics, and statistics.
Moreover, the information capacity is measured by the ratio of precisions of prior
and posterior beliefs, which extends the measurement of the quality of information
used by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) also
argue that this type of information constraint is scale neutral and empirical evidence
matches the prediction of agents' information choice in the nancial market under
the entropy-type constraint.
Information has increasing returns to its scale under information entropy. The
higher the prior precision of one type of information, the larger the maximum posterior
precision of that type of information can be learned. This have an intuitive interpre-
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tation: given the information capacity or the upper limit of information processing
capability, if the agent is initially more knowledgeable about one type of information,
say the payo information, then it just requires little of her eort to digest new piece
of information on the fundamental value of the asset and so it is more eective for
her to reduce the uncertainty in the payo information. Graphically, the complement
of the action space Ka is a convex subset in R2+ as showed in the left panel of Figure
1.3.1.
By Proposition 2.3.1, the individual problem is to maximize the posterior precision
subject to the information constraint, which is linear in the signal precisions chosen
by the agent. Therefore, the optimum must be attained at the end point of the
constraint set.9 In equilibrium, individual agent specializes of learning, i.e. chooses
to process just one type of the information. Agent a chooses to learn the payo or
be a fundamentalist if she chooses (σθ,a, σζ,a) = ((H − 1)πθ,a, 0), and chooses to learn
the supply or be a chartist if (σθ,a, σζ,a) = (0, (H − 1)πζ). Agents' choices depend on
how informative the price is revealing the payo information in the asset market.
Proposition 1.4.1. Let an asset market equilibrium D be given. Agent a chooses to
learn the payo, σζ,a = 0, if πθ,a/πζ > D
2 and chooses to learn the supply, σθ,a = 0, if
πθ,a/πζ < D
2. If πθ,a/πζ = D
2, then agent a is indierent between learning the payo
or supply.
The proof of the proposition is omitted since it is a direct corollary to the Propo-
sition 2.3.1. For two end points of the constraint set, the rate of exchange of one
unit precision of payo signal to that of the supply signal is πθ,a/πζ . Each unit of
9One of the most important dierences among various specications of information constraints
is whether the optimal solution to the information choice problem is at the corners of the constraint
set. This determines whether specialized learning, termed by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2010), emerges in the equilibrium. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) show that there can
be specialized learning when the information constraint of entropy-type or additive; Farboodi
and Veldkamp (2016) show that agents will choose to learn fundamental information when the
information capacity is low with their quadratic information constraint. We will simply focus on
the entropy-type constraint and argue for the specialized learning in the equilibrium of attention
allocation.
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incremental of the precisions of the payo and supply signal lead to one and D2 units,
respectively, of incremental in the posterior precision, that is, the (marginal) rate of
substitution of one unit precision of payo signal to that of the supply signal is 1/D2.
Hence, the comparison between rate of exchange and rate of substitution determines
the individual choice.
1.4.2 All-Fundamentalist and All-Chartist Equilibrium
Agents specialize their learning under information entropy. If all the agents choose
to learn the payo in equilibrium, then it is called an all-fundamentalist equilibrium.
Correspondingly, an all-chartist equilibrium is such that all the agents choose to learn
the supply.
The existence of all-fundamental and all-chartist equilibria requires that the sup-
port of F is bounded, i.e. there are lower bound and upper bound for an agent's
prior precision of payo information. The inmum and supremum of suppF are
denoted by πθ and π̄θ, respectively, where π̄θ can be innity. For there existing an
all-fundamentalist equilibrium, every agent chooses to learn the payo, and hence,
so does the agents with lowest prior precision of the payo information. This re-
quires that the inmum πθ of suppF to be high enough. However, in an all-chartist
equilibrium, the possibly highest prior precision π̄θ should be low enough so that
every agent, including the agents with highest prior precision, choose to learn the
supply. The following proposition characterizes the existence of all-fundamentalist
and all-chartist equilibria.
Proposition 1.4.2. Suppose that suppF is bounded, and let πθ and π̄θ be its inmum
and supremum, respectively.
(i) There exists an all-fundamentalist equilibrium if and only if
Π2θπζ/πθ ≤ λ2/(H − 1)2. (1.4.3)
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The corresponding asset market equilibrium must be a GS equilibrium.
(ii) There exists an all-chartist equilibrium if and only if
π̄θπζ ≤ λ2/(H − 1)2. (1.4.4)
The corresponding asset market equilibrium must be a COM equilibrium.
Inequality (1.4.3) is equivalent to say that πθ is at least Πθπζ/λ
2/(H − 1)2 and
inequality (1.4.4) is the same as π̄θ ≤ λ2/πζ(H − 1)2. If πθ = π̄θ = πθ, then Πθ = πθ
and both inequalities (1.4.3) and (1.4.4) reduce to the same inequality πθπζ ≤ λ2/(H−
1)2.
Note that the corresponding asset market equilibrium is a GS one in the all-
fundamentalist equilibrium and COM in the all-chartist equilibrium. First, this result
conrms Theorem 1.3.2. Even though it is possible that there is no one has private
signals on the payo, the payo informativeness is strictly positive and the asset price
is still covarying with the asset payo in an all-chartist equilibrium. Moreover, the
properties of the asset price is drastically dierent in an all-fundamentalist equilibrium
and an all-chartist one.
Corollary 1.4.1. The payo informativeness DGS of an all-fundamentalist equilib-
rium is increasing in the information capacity H but decreasing in the risk aversion
λ. The payo informativeness DCOM of an all-chartist equilibrium is decreasing in
the information capacity H but increasing in the risk aversion λ.
The comparative statics of the two types of equilibria is almost opposite to each
other. This is due to the following fact: In each type of equilibrium, the corresponding
asset market equilibrium is unique; in the all-fundamentalist equilibrium, the asset
market equilibrium is a GS equilibrium, i.e. payo informativeness is increasing in
Σθ, while in the all-chartist equilibrium, the asset market equilibrium is a COM
equilibrium.
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From the empirical point of view, although it is dicult to rule out the situation
where individual traders herd to one type of information in some extreme cases, it
is also quite often to see that agents try to dierentiate their sources of information
and choose to learn dierent types of information. Moreover, there cannot be any
all-fundamentalist and all-chartist equilibria especially when the suppF is unbounded
or it includes 0. Inequalities (1.4.3) cannot hold when πθ = 0 and inequalities (1.4.4)
cannot hold when π̄θ tends to innity.
1.4.3 Separating Equilibrium
Nevertheless there is another possibility of the equilibrium: agents dierentiates their
specialization of learning and fundamentalists and chartists coexist, which we call it
separating equilibrium because agents can be separated into two groups, fundamen-
talists and chartists. In Section 1.4.3 and Section 1.4.3, the separating equilibrium
in two dierent settings are studied respectively: Firstly, there are only two types of
agents, one with high prior precision of payo information (high type) and the other
with a low precision (low type). The general pattern of separating equilibrium is such
that high types choose to learn the payo and low types choose to learn the supply.
Secondly, in the model with continuum of agents, we further study how the cuto of
specialization endogenously determined in the equilibrium.
Two Types of Agents
First, suppose that there are only two values of the prior precision πθ,a among agents.
Given some α ∈ (0, 1), if a ≤ α, then πθ,a = π̄θ, otherwise, πθ,a = πθ, with π̄θ > πθ.
Therefore, the measure of high types, i.e. agents with πθ,a = π̄θ, is α, and measure of
low types, i.e. agents with πθ,a = πθ, is 1− α. Then, Πθ = απ̄θ + (1− α)πθ.
In this case, it is sucient to specify the strategy for each type to characterize
the equilibrium. First, Proposition 2.3.2 can be applied here and the inmum and
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supremum of suppF are πθ and π̄θ, respectively. There is an all-fundamentalist equi-
librium if and only if inequality (1.4.3) holds, and there is an all-chartist equilibrium
if and only if inequalities (1.4.4) holds.
Besides the all-fundamentalist and all-chartist equilibria, there can be another
separating equilibrium where two types take dierent actions. In particular, it must
be the case that high types choose to learn the payo and low types specialize in the
learning the supply. Suppose that, in a separating equilibrium, conversely high types
choose to learn the supply, which implies that π̄θ/πζ ≤ D2, and low types choose to
learn the payo, which implies that πθ/πζ ≥ D2. It further implies that πθ ≥ π̄θ by
transitivity, contradicting with the our assumption π̄θ > πθ.
Consider a separating strategy prole such that high types choose to learn the
payo and low types specialize in the learning the supply. Then Σθ = α(H − 1)π̄θ
and Σζ = (1 − α)(H − 1)πζ , and DGS and DCOM can be computed accordingly.
Since DGS < DCOM , such a strategy prole can be supported in an equilibrium if
and only if one of the followings holds: (i) DGS ≤
√
πθ/πζ ≤ DCOM ≤
√
π̄θ/πζ , (ii)√
πθ/πζ ≤ DGS ≤
√
π̄θ/πζ ≤ DCOM , or (iii)
√
πθ/πζ ≤ DGS < DCOM ≤
√
π̄θ/πζ .
We then have the following proposition after some algebra.
Proposition 1.4.3. There exists a separating equilibrium where high types choose to






(H−1)2 ≤ π̄θπζ; or















< α < 1
2
.
In cases (i) and (ii), there is only one separating equilibrium. There must be a
COM equilibrium in the separating equilibrium in case (i), and a GS equilibrium in
35
case (ii). However, for the very special case (iii), there are two separating equilibria
with the same attention allocation but dierent asset market equilibria.
Let us consider some numerical examples of the two-type model.
Example 1.4.1. Let πθ = 0.2, π̄θ = 1.2, πζ = 1, and H = 2. Moreover, consider the
following:




(H−1)2 ≤ π̄θπζ . Thus, there are
two equilibria: an all-fundamentalist equilibrium and a separating equilibrium.





. Again there are two
equilibria in this conguration of parameters, but one is an all-chartist equilibrium
and the other is a separating equilibrium.









< α < 1
2
. In this case, the equilibrium must be separating, i.e. the high
type specialize to learn the payo signal and the low type learn the supply signal in
the stage of attention allocation, but there could be two corresponding asset market
equilibria. Hence there are two separating (overall) equilibria.








but α > 1
2
. No equilibrium.







(H−1)2 . In this case,
there are two pooling equilibria, an all-fundamentalist and an all-chartist equilibrium.
Continuum of Types of Agents
In Section 1.4.3, if there is some heterogeneity in agents' prior precisions, then there
can be an equilibrium where dierent types of agents choose to learn dierent types of
information. It is more interesting to further ask how high the prior precision should
be so that agents will choose to learn the payo if the distribution of prior precisions
are continuous.
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Therefore, consider a continuum of types of agents, that is, the support of F
is a continuum. Specically, let suppF = [πθ, π̄θ) ⊆ [0,∞) where suppF can be
bounded, π̄θ < ∞, or unbounded, π̄θ = ∞. An agent with prior precision πθ,a of
the payo information is said to be a type πθ,a. Assume F has a continuous density
f = F ′. First, there are all-fundamentalist and all-chartist equilibria are as described
in Proposition 2.3.2 if suppF is bounded.
The separating equilibrium in this case is more interesting. As we have seen in
Section 1.4.3, high types choose to learn the payo and low types choose to learn the
supply. Because of the linearity of the objective function and shape of the information
entropy constraint set, the separating equilibrium is monotone. If some type choose to
learn the payo, then all higher types will choose to learn the payo, and conversely,
if some type choose to learn the supply, then all lower types will choose to learn the
supply. Then the following lemma is established consequently.
Lemma 1.4.1. In a separating equilibrium, there is a cuto type π∗θ such that all
agents with higher types πθ,a > π
∗
θ choose to learn the payo and all agents with lower
types πθ,a < π
∗
θ choose to learn the supply.
Remark 1.4.1. This cuto type π∗θ is endogenously determined, who is indierent to
learn either the payo or the supply, in the equilibrium. Therefore, we just call such
a type π∗θ a separating equilibrium cuto.
10
10Given a cuto type π∗θ ∈ (π, π̄), we can construct two equilibria: in one equilibrium, types
πθ,a ≥ π∗θ choose to learn the payo and types πθ,a < π∗θ choose to learn the supply; in the other
equilibrium, types πθ,a > π
∗
θ choose to learn the payo and types πθ,a ≤ π∗θ choose to learn the
supply. These two equilibria dier only on a measure zero set, so we do not distinguish these two
equilibria.
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Suppose that π∗θ is a separating equilibrium cuto. The average precisions of
signals can be calculated as




Σζ = (H − 1)πζF (π∗θ). (1.4.6)
In equilibrium with cuto π∗θ , the agent with prior precision π
∗
θ is indierent of














































The separating equilibrium cuto π∗θ has to be a root of G(π) = 0. Conversely, the
proof of Lemma 1.4.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 1 shows that π∗θ is a real root
of G(π) = 0 for π ∈ (πθ, π̄θ) is also a sucient condition for π∗θ to be a separating
equilibrium.
Lemma 1.4.2. π∗θ ∈ [πθ, π̄θ] is a separating equilibrium cuto if and only if it is a
real root of G(π) = 0.
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Note that G is a convex function. To see this, the second order derivative of G,





2 > 0. (1.4.11)
This property gives rise to some interesting corollaries. First, two sucient conditions
for the existence of a unique separating equilibrium is exactly the same as (i) and (ii)
in Proposition 2.3.3.
Proposition 1.4.4. If (i) π̄θπζ < λ
2/(H−1)2 < Πθπζ/πθ or (ii) Πθπζ/πθ < λ2/(H−
1)2 < π̄θπζ, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium.
Second, in the extreme case when suppF = R+, there cannot be any all-fundamentalist
and all-chartist equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium must be separating if there is
any equilibrium. Moreover, G(0) = Πθ > 0 and limπ→∞G(π) = ∞. The convexity








Proposition 1.4.5. Suppose that suppF = R+. Let π̊θ be the unique minimizer of
G. Then,
(i) If G(̊πθ) > 0, then there is no equilibrium.
(ii) If G(̊πθ) = 0, then there is a unique equilibrium and it is a separating equilibrium
with cuto π̊θ.
(iii) If G(̊πθ) < 0, then there are two equilibria and both are separating equilibria.
Remark 1.4.2. Suppose there are two separating equilibria, denote the larger one by
π∗,COMθ and the smaller one by π
∗,GS




θ . The separating equilibrium
π∗,COMθ correspond to a COM asset market equilibrium D
COM =
√
π∗,COMθ /πζ , while




In fact, Proposition 1.4.5 (ii) is a very special case, and except that, in (iii) we can
observe the existence of multiple equilibria π∗θ 's and the pattern of specialization in
learning: high types with πθ,a ≥ π∗θ choose to learn the payo signals and low types
πθ,a < π
∗
θ focus on learning the supply signal.
Finally, we examine some numerical examples of continuum-type models.
Example 1.4.2. Let πζ = 1 and H = 2. Consider that the distribution of prior







= 2.45 and π̄θπζ = 1.2. So if
√
1.2 ≤ λ <
√
2.45, then there is
an all-chartist equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. Moreover, when λ ≥
√
2.45,
then two pure equilibria co-exist. If λ <
√
1.2, then there will be no pure equilibrium,
and the separating equilibrium π∗θ satises the following equation
0.5π∗θ − 0.2π∗θ + 0.72− λ
√
π∗θ = 0. (1.4.13)
Example 1.4.3. Let πζ = 1 and H = 2. Consider that the distribution of prior
precision is exponential with mean Πθ, i.e. F (πθ) = 1 − e−πθ/Πθ . If there exists any





π∗θ = 0. (1.4.14)
Comparative Statics of Separating Equilibria. We study the comparative
statics of the separating equilibrium, in particular, when suppF = R+ and G(̊πθ) < 0,
the case (iii) in Proposition 1.4.5. Under these assumptions, there can be only two
separating equilibria. Note that the cuto π∗θ of a separating equilibrium characterizes
not only the attention allocation strategy in equilibrium but also the corresponding




Figure 1.4.1: Eects of changing information capacity H
Figure 1.4.2: Eects of changing risk aversion λ.
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Proposition 1.4.6. Let π∗,COMθ and π
∗,GS
θ be two separating equilibria dened as in
remark 1.4.2 in the same economy. Then π∗,COMθ is decreasing in information capacity
H but increasing in risk aversion λ, and π∗,GSθ is increasing in information capacity
H but decreasing in risk aversion λ.
To see Proposition 1.4.6 more clearly, look at the Figure 1.4.1 and 1.4.2. Increasing
information capacity from H to H ′ moves the curve G upwards, therefore, the larger
root of G shifts left and smaller root right given the shape of curve G, while increasing
risk aversion from λ to λ′ has the exactly opposite eects.
Remark 1.4.3. Each separating equilibrium π∗θ also characterizes its corresponding
asset market D =
√
π∗θ/πζ . Therefore, for the larger separating equilibrium π
∗
θ , its
corresponding COM asset market equilibrium DCOM is decreasing in information
capacity H but increasing in risk aversion λ, while, for the smaller separating equilib-
rium π∗θ , it is exactly opposite for the corresponding GS asset market equilibriumD
GS.
This observation mirrors the same properties, Corollary 1.4.1, of all-fundamentalist
and all-chartist equilibria.
1.5 Existence of Equilibrium
In this section, we return to the model in Section 1.3 and discuss the existence of equi-
librium in general. For a xed pr-REE D, the mapping a 7→ UDa is measurable since
we assume the mapping from a to the individual characteristics to be measurable;
and hence it denes a game with a continuum of atomless agents (e.g. Schmeidler
(1973), Mas-Colell (1984), and Rath (1992)) or an aggregative game, where each
agent's expected utility only depends on her own strategy and some aggregates of the
strategies of all the agents, Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ in this case.
Here we follow the approach of Rath (1992). Dene a strategy prole (σθ,·, σζ,·)



















∣∣∣Σ̂θΣ̂ζ ≤ 1/4} . (1.5.2)
The set S is the set of all possible aggregates Σ̂θ and Σ̂ζ given individual agent's
action space Ka, while set T is the set of aggregates where there exists some pr-REE
so that the expected utility function UDa (σθ,a, σζ,a; ·, ·) are dened for each agent a.







(σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka
∣∣∣∣ D = D` and (1.5.3)
UDa
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, ∀ (σθ, σζ) ∈ Ka
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and D constitute an
overall equilibrium.
Following the proof of Theorem 2 in Rath (1992), we can show that B` is non-






able selection. Consequently, Γ` is non-empty- and convex-valued and has a closed
graph. However, to evoke Kakutani's xed point theorem for the correspondence Γ, it
has to hold that T = S, otherwise the existence of equilibrium cannot be guaranteed.
These results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.5.1. There exist an equilibrium of the game of attention allocation if and
only if the correspondence Γ`, ` ∈ {GS,COM}, dened by (1.5.4) has a xed point.
The existence of the equilibrium can be guaranteed if each agent a (except for a
null set) are suciently risk averse and {Ka}a∈[0,1] has an essential supremum so that
Σ̂θΣ̂ζ ≤ 1/4 holds.
Theorem 1.5.1. Suppose that λa is bounded below by λ > 0 and Ka is bounded above
by (σ̄θ, σ̄ζ) for almost every a ∈ [0, 1]. There exists an equilibrium of the game of
attention allocation if λ ≥ 2√σ̄θσ̄ζ.
The other interpretation of the sucient condition λ ≥ 2√σ̄θσ̄ζ is that the
information limits are small enough so that it ensure that S = T to apply the xed
point theorem. However, S = T is only a sucient condition because it is possible
for Γ` admits a xed point even though T ⊂ S. Moreover, because there can be two
dierent asset market equilibrium DCOM and DGS, there can be a xed point for
ΓGS and another xed point for ΓCOM , so typically there will be at least two overall
equilibria: one equilibrium consists of a COM equilibrium, and the other of a GS
equilibrium.
1.6 Conclusion and Implications
In this study, we consider an environment where asset price is aected by both its
fundamental value and market conditions. The payo and supply information are
both learnable to the agents. Typically the asset market will admit multiple equilibria.
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In the rational expectation equilibrium, the price aggregates individual choices in this
environment and also serves a public signal, and hence the aggregation of information
imposes some externalities on individuals. Knowing that the aggregation of informa-
tion choices would aect the payo informativeness of the asset price, the agents
have to take it into account when they are acquiring information. The multiplicity of
equilibria is transmitted from the asset market to the game of attention allocation. It
is common to see that multiple equilibria can exist in the attention allocation game.
We establish some key insights from the model under information entropy con-
straint. Agents' dierence in prior precisions, indicating dierent endowed infor-
mation sources or estimation procedures, leads to a general pattern of specialized
learning emerges: typically agents with relatively higher prior precision about the
payo information choose to the learn the payo signals, and the rest learn the supply
signals. There can be multiple equilibria. In particular, when there is a continuum
of unbounded types of agents, the payo informativeness of the asset price is higher
in an equilibrium where the number of fundamentalists is fewer.
Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016) document a secular shift in nancial analysis from
fundamental analysis (learning the payo) to demand analysis (learning the supply)
and, at the same time, the payo informativeness is increasing over time. They argue
that this phenomenon is a consequence of increasing information capacity. However,
their results crucially depend on their assumption of concave information constraints.
Because of diminishing return of the payo information, the incentive of processing
additional payo information is weakened over time and each individual chooses to
learn more about the supply.
In this paper, we can oer an alternative explanation of this secular shift in nan-
cial analysis as a consequence of increasing information capacity. Suppose that agents
coordinate on the GS asset market equilibrium. Then, in a separating equilibrium,
the cuto, i.e. the lowest prior precision of the payo information for agents to choose
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to learn the payo, is increasing so that the some of the fundamentalists switches to
the chartists. Therefore, there are more traders, e.g. retailing investors, hedge fund
managers, etc., choose to process the supply information (non-fundamental data).
Moreover, the payo informativeness of the asset price increases as argued in Remark
1.4.3.
However, there are also some dierent empirical implications between this paper
and Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016). According to their argument, as information
technology improves and information capacity increases, each trader chooses to use
more demand analysis (learn more about the supply). However, in our model,
agents do not change their specialization of learning, which crucially depends on
their prior precisions, if their individual information capacity increases. The increase
in information capacity has an equilibrium eect leading to that some agents switch
their specialization of learning because the payo informativeness of the asset price
also increases. Therefore, a close examination whether individual investors, e.g. fund




Strategic Timing in Information
Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
Information is crucial in the nancial markets. However, traders are not born with
information. Acquiring information increases traders' expected prots, but it is costly.
Moreover, the cost and benet of acquiring information can change over time, as does
the incentive for acquiring information. Traders evaluate the benet against the
cost of acquiring information according to their prior knowledge and the evolution of
market conditions.
The literature on information acquisition in nancial markets starts with Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980). While many studies relate to static information acquisition,
Banerjee and Breon-Drish (2016) extend to how an individual acquires information
dynamically as a problem of exercising a real option in a Kyle's (1985) trading
mechanism, and they ask when does a trader decide to become informed. Similar
to irreversible investments, traders delay the acquisition of information. The trader
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will only take action when the expected payo is higher than what would be necessary
to cover the costs.
When multiple traders can become informed, the timing of their information
acquisition is further complicated by competition. On the one hand, information
reduces uncertainty and increases the informed traders' expected prot. This is
especially true when one trader acquires information earlier than the other. The
trader can enjoy an informational advantage and experience reduced competition in
trading with other traders so that they can trade aggressively and earn more than
anticipated prots. On the other hand, while one trader pays the cost of acquiring
information, some information can be disclosed to another trader who does not need
to pay a penny. Uninformed traders can wait for free access to the information for
which other traders have paid.
In this paper, we study when traders choose to be informed if they are competing
for acquiring information. In the model, the trading decisions are simple so that
attention can be concentrated on the timing decisions between traders. Time is
continuous and asset prices evolves over time. Without acquiring private information,
traders are indierent as to whether or not they trade. Only after uncovering some
piece of information, and when the private belief is divergent from the public belief,
will the trader choose to trade in the favored direction up to their trading capacity,
i.e. the maximum trading volume allowed in each unit of time.
The market conditions, or the asset price, uctuate driven by public information
and two traders decide when to acquire information on the asset payo. Motivated
by the trade-os mentioned above, two specic externalities are present: information
externality, i.e. the spillover of the information from the informed trader to the
uninformed trader, and trading externality, i.e. an informed trader's trading volume
and protability being aected by the presence of another informed trader.
48
Once a trader acquires information, some additional information may be disclosed
to the other trader. Think of two traders in one asset management rm. If one trader
acquires information, then the other trader may observe some evidence from the
rst trader's trading records, notes, or even from rumors. This possible information
spillover is the information externality and, modeled as a signal; it can be observed by
the uninformed trader. This assumption makes the second-mover's position advanta-
geous because they will have the opportunity to free-ride the rst-mover's information.
Therefore, the strength of the second-mover advantage is determined by the accuracy
of the signal and the extent to which the uninformed trader can free-ride on the
information acquired by the rst-mover.
The assumption on trading externality is motivated by the observation that com-
petition on trading can make traders trade less aggressively and reduce their expected
prot. In Kyle's trading with multiple informed agents, e.g., Back et al. (2000), the
prot of imperfectly competing traders is lower than that of a single informed traders.
More importantly, the trading externality assumption strengthens the rst-mover
advantage because it allows the trader to trade more aggressively to prot from the
information if she can acquire the information earlier than the other trader.
Consequently, whether the rst-mover advantage dominates the second-mover
advantage, or vice versa, determines the nature of the game. If the rst-mover
advantage dominates, then the timing of the information acquisition is a preemption
game, where the rst trader who acquires information wants to act earlier. Otherwise,
if the second-mover advantage dominates, the timing game is a war of attrition, where
traders will be reluctant to take the lead in information acquisition.
In contrast to the situation where there is only one trader, the trader will acquire
information earlier in a preemption game with little information externality. However,
when the information externality is strong enough, and hence so is the second-mover
advantage, the trader will acquire the information later, even though the timing
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game is a preemption game. Moreover, the trader will acquire information strictly
later than the timing decision when there is only one trader in a war of attrition when
the information externality is strong enough.
Recently some papers extend the discussion on information acquisition to the
dynamic trading environments, e.g., Mendelson and Tunca (2003), Avdis (2016), but
the information acquisition is indeed staticthe trader can only decide to acquire
information prior to the trading starts. Banerjee and Breon-Drish (2016) are the
rst to study when a trader chooses to be informed conditional on the public signals.
Although there are several papers (e.g., Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster
and Viswanathan (1996), Back et al. (2000)) studying the dynamic trading with
imperfect competition among several informed traders, there are no prior studies on
the competition on timing of information acquisition among traders. This paper thus
lls the gap and motivated to study when and how two traders compete for acquiring
information.
Moreover, similar to Banerjee and Breon-Drish (2016), this paper is also based on
the real option approach to irreversible investment (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).
To study the strategic interaction of two traders, our model is built on the framework
of real option games. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) studies the timing game without
uncertainty, while Smets (1994) rst studies the continuous-time option game in his
doctoral dissertation. A number of papers (e.g. Huisman and Kort (1999),Lambrecht
(2001), Grenadier (2002), Murto (2004), Dias and Teixeira (2010), etc.) extends
the real option game approach in one way or another. In particular, Décamps and
Mariotti (2004) and Thijssen et al. (2006) consider the externalities from learning
and information which cause second-mover advantage in the timing game. Last but
not least, it is very instructive of Dutta and Rustichini (1993) to solve the equilibria
of the model in this study.
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The plan for the rest of the paper is as follow. Section 2.2 describes the set-up
of the model. Then, in Section 2.3, the timing decisions without strategic interaction
are studied, which are served as i) benchmark for comparison with the timing decision
with strategic interaction and ii) foundations for further analysis of the equilibrium
in the timing game. Then we analyze the equilibria of the timing decisions with
strategic considerations in Section 2.4. All the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Model Setup
The time t ∈ [0,∞) is continuous. Fix a ltered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) on
which the standard Brownian motion (B,Z) and independent random variable v and
T are dened.
There is a risky asset trading in the market. The asset will be liquidated at
a random date T , where T follows an exponential distribution exp(λ) with rate
parameter λ. Following Banerjee and Breon-Drish (2016), assume that the liquidation
value of the asset is
V = vYT . (2.2.1)
Y is a publicly observable process, which can be interpreted as news or public
information, and it evolves stochastically as
Yt = σBt (2.2.2)
with B a standard Brownian motion. However, v ∈ {0, 1} is unobservable unless
someone acquires information and reveals it privately to herself. Agents have a
common prior belief Pr(v = 1) = p ∈ (0, 1) before revealing it or receiving any
signal.
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The asset price Pt is exogenously determined to be the expectation of its nal
payo given public information, i.e.
Pt = Et[V ] = pYt (2.2.3)
where Et[·] = E[·|(Ys)s≤t]. Note that Yt is a martingale w.r.t. the ltration generated
by (Yt) so the price is a martingale as well. This assumption can be interpreted
as that there is a risk neutral market maker who sets the price according to public
information. Moreover, the trading volume from the potentially informed traders is
supposed to be far less than the total trading volume in the market, so it has barely
any eects on the price.
There are two traders i ∈ {1, 2}, who are not informed at time 0, meaning that
they believe that v = 1 with probability p as public belief. However, each trader i can
observe the value of v privately at a xed cost c at any time t ≥ 0. We call the trader
whoever acquires information rst the leader, and the other trader the follower, if
they are not acquiring information simultaneously.
Due to the assumption that the asset price is exogenously determined, once some
trader acquires information the other agent cannot learn anything from the price.
However, to introduce some information externality, we follow the idea similar to
Fajgelbaum et al. (forthcoming) such that, whenever someone acquires information
rst, a free binary signal s ∈ {0, 1} is revealed to the other trader. This assumption
captures the eect of social learning in an environment with multiple agents. One
trader may observe the other trader directly or hear some rumor so that she can get
some clue about the information acquired by the other. Moreover, for simplicity, the
signal is assumed to be symmetric in the sense that




The value q hence characterizes the accuracy of the signal: the signal is fully revealing
the value v if q = 1, but it is not uninformative if q = 1/2. Typically, we assume
q ∈ (1/2, 1) so that the signal is informative and yet not fulling revealing. However, we
also consider extreme cases when either the signal is uninformative, i.e. q = 1/2, and it
is fully revealing, i.e. q = 1 occasionally in the subsequent analysis. This assumption
on information externality is crucial to introduces second-mover advantage in the
timing game. With possibility of free-riding the information through the signal from
the leader, it gives agents the incentive to become a follower.
Let us denote ρs the unconditional probability of signal s. Then,
ρ1 = pq + (1− p)(1− q), (2.2.5)
ρ0 = p(1− q) + (1− p)q. (2.2.6)
Moreover, we denote ps = Pr(v = 1|s) the posterior of the follower given signal s,













p(1− q) + (1− p)q
. (2.2.8)
Besides the information externalities through the free signal, the information
acquisition aects the maximum trading volume, or the trading capacity, of each
trader and her opponent in dierent situations. Without acquiring information, each
trader can trade, i.e. buy or sell, at most θ0 shares in each unit of time. Moreover,
information acquisition is accompanied by increased trading capacity. If trader i, the
leader, acquire the information rst, then she can trade at most θ1 = θ̂1 + θ0 shares,
and the other trader −i, the follower, can still trade θ0 share in each unit of time when
she has not acquired information. This assumption captures that whenever someone
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has advantage in information, she will trade more aggressively. Think of that, in a
asset management company, if one trader believes that she has superior information,
then she will persuade the fund manager to allocation more capital to her trading
account.
Furthermore, if both traders acquire information, each trader i can trade at most
θ2 = θ̂2 + θ0 share in each unit of time; and we assume that θ̂1 > θ̂2 ≥ 0 so that
we have θ1 > θ2 ≥ θ0. This means that the trading capacity of the leader will be
reduced from θ1 to θ2, while the follower's trading capacity will increase from θ0 to
θ2, when the follower acquires information. It is essentially saying that, when the
follower acquires information, she will trader more aggressively and squeeze out the
leader in the market. Again, think of that, if two traders both have the information
and come to the fund manager, the fund manager will increase the capital allocation
to each trader; but there is an upper limit for the total capital available for these
two traders, so the fund manager cannot increase capital allocation to each trader as
much as that for only one informed trader. This assumption captures the externality
from competition: when another trader, the follower, acquires information, she act
as an entrant to the market and encroach the prot of the incumbent or the leader
in the market, the trader who acquires information rst.
Let τi denote the time of trader i acquiring information and xit denote the share of
the asset purchased (or sold if it is negative) by trader i at time t. Then, we assume
that traders are risk neutral, and they maximize their expected prot from trading,












where the equality holds because T ∼ Exp(λ). However, the explicit expression of
the expected prot depends on who moves rst, for example, if τi ≤ τj, i.e. trader i
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Note that during the time period between τi and τj, two traders have dierent
information and dierent trading capacity.
2.2.2 Trading Decision and Expected Prot Flow
In this subsection, we x the timing decision τi for each trader and then analyze
the trading decision only and compute the expected prot ow at each unit of time.
Consider the trading decision for each trader in three scenarios: 1) Both traders have
not acquired information; 2) one trader has acquired information, but the other has
not; and 3) both traders have acquired information. And in the second scenario, we
discuss trading decisions for both a leader and a follower. Since traders are ex ante
identical and role of the trader, either a leader or a follower, captures the dierence of
the traders, the subscripts i are dropped in this subsection and focus on the trading
decision for dierent roles of the traders in dierent scenarios. Much of the analysis
on timing of information acquisition resembles the analysis of timing of entering
market in the industrial organization literature. From this perspective, the second
scenario is called the information monopoly phase because it is like the trader who
has acquired information has monopoly power over the true valuation. Once the
follower acquires information, then the competition between two traders resembles
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the competition between two rms in a duopoly market, and the third scenario is
called the information duopoly phase.
Because there is no strategic or intertemporal eects for individual trading activ-
ities, the optimal trading problem can be considered as a series of static individual
optimization problems, i.e. optimal trading xt simply maximizes the ow of expected
prot, i.e.
xt ∈ arg maxE [(V − Pt)x|It] (2.2.12)
where E[·|It] is the expectation operator with respect of trader's information set It
at time t. Note that, for t < T ,
Et [(V − Pt)xt] = Et [(vYT − pYt)xt]
= Yt (Et [v]− p)xt, (2.2.13)
where the second equality holds because Yt is a martingale. Therefore, the trading
decision is simply comparing the valuation of the trader with the public belief.
Suppose the trader has not acquired information. She holds the same belief as
market maker so that the asset price is fair to her, i.e. Et [v] = p, and she is indierent
to buy or sell the asset. To pin down their trading decision uniquely, impose that
xt = 0 if the trader has not acquired information. This assumption is innocuous
because the expected prot will be zero no matter what xt is.
In the information monopoly phase, if one has acquired information but the other
has not, then the additional information they see generates dierence between their
belief and public belief. And if Et [v] 6= p, the solution must be bang-bang because
of the objective function is linear in xt. Therefore, given that p ∈ (0, 1), the optimal
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trading decision for the leader, who has acquired information, is as follow:
xt =

θ1 v = 1
−θ1 v = 0
. (2.2.14)




θ0 s = 1
−θ0 s = 0
. (2.2.15)
Finally, when both traders have revealed v, then they do not have asymmetry in
information and dierence in trading capacity any more and both choose
xt =

θ2 v = 1
−θ2 v = 0
. (2.2.16)
Given the analysis of optimal trading decisions in dierent scenarios, the expected
prot ow in each unit of time can be computed under dierent situations easily.
However, rst dene the following prot multipliers : for v = 0, 1 and s = 0, 1,
πL,v = |v − p|θ1, (2.2.17)
πsF = |ps − p|θ0 = (2q − 1)p(1− p)θ0/ρs, (2.2.18)
πD,v = |v − p|θ2, (2.2.19)
where πL,v and π
s
F are the prot multipliers for the leader who reveals v and the
follower who receives signal s, respectively, in the information monopoly phase, and
πD,v is the prot multiplier for both traders conditional on v in the information
duopoly phase. The, for example, the leader who reveals v = 1 in the information
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monopoly phase has expected prot ow
Et [(V − Pt)xt] = Yt (Et [v]− p) θ1
= Yt(1− p)θ1 = YtπL,1 (2.2.20)
where the rst equality follow Equation (2.2.13) and optimal trading decision for
the leader (2.2.14), and the second equality due to the fact that the in the leader's
information set v = 1, and, nally, Equation (2.2.17) implies that πL,1 = (1 − p)θ1.
Therefore, using the similar arguments, the following list summarizes expected prot
ows in some situations:
 YtπL,v the expected prot ows of the leader who reveals information v in the
information monopoly phase,
 YtπsF the expected prot ow of the follower who receives signal s in the
information monopoly phase, and
 YtπD,vthe expected prot ow for both traders conditional on v in the infor-
mation duopoly phase.
In the same fashion, let us dene some other useful prot multipliers as follow. The
unconditional expected prot multiplier πL of a leader is
πL = pπL,1 + (1− p)πL,0 = 2p(1− p)θ1; (2.2.21)
the unconditional expected prot multiplier πF of a follower is
πF = ρ
1πF,1 + ρ
0πF,0 = 2p(1− p)(2q − 1)θ0; (2.2.22)
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the unconditional expected prot multiplier πD of a trader in the information duopoly
phase is
πD = pπD,1 + (1− p)πD,0 = 2p(1− p)θ2. (2.2.23)
Moreover, the prot multiplier πsD for the information duopoly phase of a follower
receiving signal s is
πsD = p
sπD,1 + (1− ps)πD,0 = p(1− p)θ2/ρs. (2.2.24)
Correspondingly,
 YtπL and YtπF are the unconditional expected prot of a leader and a follower,
respectively,
 YtπD is the unconditional expected prot ow during the information duopoly
phase, and
 YtπsD is the expected prot ow in the information duopoly phase of a follower
who just knows the signal s.
2.3 The Timing Decision without Strategic Interac-
tion
This section studies the timing decision without strategic consideration in four scenar-
ios: 1) the timing decision when there is only one trader who can acquire information;
2) the timing decision of a designated follower; 3) the timing decision of a designated
leader; and 4) the optimal timing of acquiring information when two traders have
to move simultaneously. Since in each of the scenarios the role of the traders are
designated, the subscriptions i are dropped in this section. The purpose of this
section is, rst, to set a benchmark to contrast them with the situation when there
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are strategic interactions and, second, to serve as a starting point to analyze the
strategic timing decisions.
2.3.1 Information Monopoly
First, to set a benchmark, assume there is only one trader who can potentially acquire
information in this subsection, and we refer her the information monopoly once she
acquires information. The environment, including the information structure and
trading arrangement, are the same as before, except that, since there is only one
trader can acquire information, it is not necessary to have the information spillover,
the free signal generated by acquiring information, and the trader has no need to
concern the competition in the future to decrease her trading capacity from θ1 to θ2.
Then the problem becomes a standard individual stopping problem. Suppose
that the trader decides whether or not to acquire information at time τ < T . At
this point that she has not revealed v, her unconditional expected prot ow is YτπL




e−λuYτπLdu = YτπL/λ. Note that there is a cost c of acquiring information,
hence, like a perpetual American put option, the nal payo at the time τ of acquiring















whereM(y) is the value function for the trader when the current state, i.e. the public
information, is Y0 = y.
By standard textbook argument (see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), the optimal
timing has the form
τM = inf {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ YM} (2.3.2)
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for some threshold YM > 0. Denote a constant β, which will be useful throughout









Then, the solution to the problem is solved and summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2.3.1. The optimal timing solution to the Problem (2.3.1) is τM =
















y < YM ,
yπL
λ
− c y ≥ YM .
(2.3.5)
2.3.2 The Follower's Problem
Next, think of the environment with two potentially informed traders. When one
trader has acquired information, the other trader, the follower who sees the signal s,
choose her timing τ sF to acquire information. This problem is another individual stop-
ping problem. However, the follower, depending on the signal s, has some information
advantage over the market maker, so she trades and has positive expected prot ow
Ytπ
s
F even before the she acquires information. After she acquires information at time
τ sF , the expected prot ow would be YtπD,v since it will enter an information duopoly
phase when both traders acquire information. Hence, the expected prot of a follower
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who acquires information at τ sF conditional on current state Y0 = y is








e−λuYuπD,v − e−λτF c
)+












du|s, Y0 = y
]
(2.3.6)
for s ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, her problem is
F s(y) = max
τsF
Js[τ sF ; y] (2.3.7)
where F s(y) is the value function for the designated follower who receives signal
s. Again, consider the optimal timing has the form τ sF = inf {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ Y sF} with
threshold Y sF .
Proposition 2.3.2. Suppose that θ̂2 > 0 or q < 1. Then the solution to the optimal







and the value function is
F s(y) =










y < Y sF ,
yπsD
λ
− c y ≥ Y sF ,
(2.3.9)
where β is dened by equation (2.3.3). Moreover, if either (i) θ̂2 = 0 and q → 1 or
(ii) θ̂2 → 0 and q = 1, then Y sF →∞ and τ sF →∞.
The optimal timing problem for each type of follower is solved in the same way
as that in the last subsection. However, the last statement of the proposition means
that, if acquiring information is not improving the follower's information advantage
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or trading capacity, then the follower will never acquire information by herself. So,
to make the timing problem for the follower meaningful, θ̂2 > 0 or q < 1 is usually
imposed if there is no other clarication.
It is also useful to compute the ex ante expected value F (y) to be a follower
because the trader has not seen the signal when later it comes to the analysis whether
a trader choose to become a leader or a follower. Simply, we take unconditional
expectation of the follower's value:



































− ρ0c Y 0F ≤ y < Y 1F
yπD
λ








1−β + (Y 0F,0)
1−β] . (2.3.11)




F with exponent 1− β so that it must be
that min {Y 0F , Y 1F } ≤ ŶF ≤ max {Y 0F , Y 1F }.
The change in signal, q, as a parameter for the value function provides interesting
comparative statics. Denote F (y; q) the value function of the designated follower with
Y0 = y and given the signal accuracy q. Then, intuitively, the follower can grasp more
benet from it in expectation with the accuracy of signal increased. Therefore, if q is
higher, F (y; q) will be also higher for each y < max {Y 1F , Y 0F }.
Lemma 2.3.1. F (y; q) is strictly increasing in q ∈ [1/2, 1] for each y < max {Y 0F , Y 1F },
and it is constant w.r.t. q when y ≥ max {Y 0F , Y 1F }.
Moreover, the thresholds Y sF 's also change w.r.t. the change in signal precision q.
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Lemma 2.3.2. If 1/2 < p < 1, then Y 1F ≥ Y 0F , moreover, Y 1F is increasing in q and
Y 0F is decreasing in q.
If 0 < p < 1/2, then Y 0F ≥ Y 1F , moreover, Y 0F is increasing in q and Y 1F is decreasing
in q.
If p = 1/2, then Y 1F = Y
0




F is increasing in q.
As a corollary of Lemma 2.3.2, max {Y 0F , Y 1F } is increasing in the precision q of
the signal.
2.3.3 Leader's Value and Designated Leader's Problem
Now consider another situation with two traders with their roles predetermined: one
trader, the designated follower, has to acquire information after the other trader, the
designated leader. The designated follower will choose her timing optimally just as
specied in Section 2.3.2. To formulate and solve the designated leader's problem,
the rst thing to do is to compute the leader's value L(y) during the informational
monopoly phase.
Given that the leader observes v and generates signal s, and the other player will


























)β Y sF (πD,v−πL,v)
λ
y < Y sF
yπD,v
λ
y ≥ Y sF
. (2.3.12)
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Y 0F ≤ y < Y 1F
yπD
λ
y ≥ max {Y 0F , Y 1F }
(2.3.13)
Then, the designated leader's problem is





+ |Y0 = y
]
(2.3.14)
where V (y) is the value function of a designated leader when current state, i.e. the
public information, is y. This optimal stopping problem can be solved with similar
method as before in the Appendix, except that we need to make additional eorts to
discuss dierent cases.
Proposition 2.3.3. The solution to the optimal stopping problem (2.3.14) is













πL ≤ maxs {πsD − πsF} .
(2.3.16)
2.3.4 Simultaneous Move
For the last scenario without strategic interaction, consider the case that two traders
acquire information always at the same time. This means that no one has the
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opportunity to see the signal to make decision, moreover, they directly enter the
information duopoly phase after acquiring information. Hence, their optimal stopping
problem is just like a standard individual stopping problem, but their expected prot














where S(y) is the value function for the trader when the current state is y.






















− c y ≥ YS.
(2.3.19)
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, the strategic interaction of two traders is analyzed by the approach
of real option games. The equilibrium notion employed here is the Markov perfect
equilibrium. In fact, we focus on a specic class of MPE, namely the stopping equilibria
as dened by Dutta and Rustichini (1993).
Note that once the rst trader acquires information and becomes the leader, the
other remaining trader receives the signal s and get the terminal payo as a follower,
whose value and optimal choice are fully characterizes in the follower's problem of the
Section 2.3.2. Therefore our attention can be restricted to a game that ends when
one of the traders acquires information. Consequently, it is sucient to only consider
the the timing strategy τi of each trader i when no one has acquired information, and
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the equilibrium (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) of the game would be a pair of such timing strategies for each
trader. In particular, we focus on a specic class of Markov strategies as considered
in Dutta and Rustichini (1993), that is, the traders i choose the exercise boundary Yi
of the stopping time τi = inf {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ Yi} when no one has acquired information.
Let's denote T denote the set of all such strategies.
An other issue associated with a timing game is that players may choose to
stop at the same time. To deal with this, the usual assumption is adopted here:
If two traders move at the same time, then with one-half probability, one of them
get the information and the other could not, and the roles of two traders switch
otherwise. The trader who fails to acquire information has a second chance to choose
to either become a follower, receiving the signal and then timing optimally, or try
immediately again without looking at the signal. Two traders move simultaneously
as considered in the Section 2.3.4 if it is the second case. More specically, suppose at
time t both traders attempt to acquire information. The one who fails to reveal the
information will choose terminal payo max {F (Yt), S(Yt)} rationally. So only when
max {F (Yt), S(Yt)} = S(Yt), the remaining uninformed trader would like to move
simultaneously, i.e. try again immediately without revealing the signal.
However, the next lemma shows that it is never optimal to move simultaneously
when q > 1/2. The intuition is simple: The trader prefer becoming a follower rather
than moving simultaneously because of the possibility of free-ride on the information.
And in fact, move simultaneously is weekly dominated by being a follower, and strictly
dominated when Yt < max {Y 0F , Y 1F } .




Given the above lemma that the traders never strictly prefer to move simultane-
ously, therefore their payo can be written as a function of their strategies (τ1, τ2)
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and the current state y: The payo of trader i is




L(Yτi)χ{τi<τ−i} + F (Yτ−i)χ{τi>τ−i}
+






where we use notation i and −i in the usual way, if i = 1 then −i = 2; and vice versa.
Then, the equilibrium is dened as usual.
Denition 2.4.1. The strategy prole (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an equilibrium if





for i = 1, 2 and all y ≥ 0.
Moreover, there is a distinction between two classes of a real option game or a
timing game: a preemption game and a war of attrition. Typically, this two types of
timing game prescribe dierent incentive for the agents to act as early as possible or
as late as possible.
Denition 2.4.2. The timing game is a preemption game if L(YL) > F (YL) and it
is a war of attrition if L(YL) ≤ F (YL).
Specically, in a preemption game, the agents want to preempt in the following
sense: Think of a timing game with two agents and one agents is designated follower,
then according to the analysis in the previous section, the designated leader should
optimally move at τL, i.e. when Yt reaches the threshold YL. However, the designated
follower has incentive to deviate: Suppose now the state Yt = YL − ε for some ε > 0
small enough so that L(YL − ε) > F (YL − ε) by continuity, the designated follower
would move at this point because she can get value L(YL − ε) by preempting instead
of getting the follower's value F (YL− ε) if she waits for the designated leader moving
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rst. In a war of attrition, on the contrary, the designated follower has no incentive to
lead, and in fact the designated leader wants to postpone her move as late as possible.
Moreover, in this timing game, there are two major trade-os: the leader can enjoy
the rst-mover advantage, the extra prot during the information monopoly phase by
trading more aggressively due to the higher trading capacity, while the follower has
the second-mover advantage, the possibility of free-riding on the information acquired
by the leader. If the rst-mover advantage dominates, then the game is a preemption
game, otherwise it is a war of attrition. Therefore, the trading capacity and the
accuracy of the signal can alter the nature of this timing games. The following series
of lemmas shows how the nature of the game of information acquisition is associated
with these parameters.
Lemma 2.4.2. Suppose q = 1/2, then YL = YM and L(YL) > F (YL) given that
θ̂1 > θ̂2 ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.4.2 says that, if the signal is uninformative, then the game must be
a preemption as long as the information monopoly has extended trading capacity
because there is only rst-mover advantage but no second-mover advantage. Briey,
suppose that in an extreme case that θ̂1 = θ̂2 > 0 and q = 1/2, it will turn out to be
the case that the equilibrium to this case is exactly to the solution of an individual
optimal stopping problem. Moreover, one corollary to this lemma is that the for
any θ̂1 > θ̂2 ≥ 0, if q > 1/2 is small enough, by continuity of leader's value L and
follower's value F , it must be the case that L(YL) > F (YL), and hence, the game is
a preemption game.
Proposition 2.4.1. Given that θ̂1 > θ̂2 ≥ 0, the timing game is a preemption game
if 1/2 ≤ q < q∗ for some q∗ > 1/2.
The above shows that the rst-mover advantage dominates when the information
externality is possibly weakest, i.e. q = 1/2. However, when the information ex-
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ternality is possibly strongest, i.e. q = 1, it does not guarantee the second-mover


















































Lemma 2.4.3. L(YL) < F (YL) when q = 1 if one of the following conditions hold:


























Then, by the fact that L(YL) − F (YL) continuously depends on the parameter q
and the fact that L(YL) − F (YL) > 0 when q = 1/2, there must exist some 1/2 <
q∗ < 1 such that L(YL)− F (YL) < 0 for all q > q∗. Hence, the following proposition
summarizes the conditions when the timing game is a war of attrition.
Proposition 2.4.2. Under either Condition A, B, or C, there exists some q∗ ∈
(1/2, 1) such that the timing game is a war of attrition if q ≥ q∗.
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is small because they are equivalent to that L(YL)−F (YL)
is small. Moreover, these functions, h(a, b), g0(a, b), and g1(a, b), are all increasing
in the rst argument a and decreasing in the second argument b when b ≤ a. Note











, hence, the rst-mover will be weaken. Therefore,
the interpretation of Conditions A, B, and C are essentially the same: it requires
that the trading capacity, both θ̂1 and θ̂2, of informed traders to be suciently small,
especially a small θ̂2, will render this timing game of information acquisition a war
of attrition along with a strong enough second-mover advantage or a high enough
accuracy of the signal.
After discussing when the timing game of information acquisition is a preemption
game and when it is a war of attrition, the equilibrium is analyzed in these two
dierent cases. First, assume that the timing game is a preemption game, that is
L(YL) > F (YL). If one trader, say trader 1, believes that the other trader, trader
2, will not preempt, then it is optimal to acquire information when Yt reaches YL.
Suppose that ε > 0 is suciently small, then L(YL − ε) > F (YL − ε) by continuity.
However, at this time, by preempting at YL−ε, trader 2's expected utility jumps from
F (YL− ε) to L(YL− ε) so that she is strictly better o. Applying the same logic, then
trader 1 will want to preempt when Yt = YL − 2ε if she knows that trader 2 acquires
information at YL−ε, and so on and so forth. This process of one preempting another
continues until it reaches the point such that L(YP ) = F (YP ) for some YP < YL; and
the following lemma established the existence and uniqueness of such YP .
Lemma 2.4.4. Suppose that L(YL) > F (YL). Then there exists a unique YP ∈ (0, YL)
such that L(YL) = F (YL).
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Moreover, since two traders are symmetric, the above argument can be symmet-
rically applied to both traders, so the only possible equilibrium is that both traders
want to acquire information at YP . We can verify that it is an equilibrium and it is
unique.
Proposition 2.4.3. Suppose that the timing game is a preemption game, i.e. L(YL) >




2 ) such that
τ ∗1 (y) = τ
∗
2 (y) = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ YP} .
To contrast the timing decision of an information monopoly and a leader's tim-
ing in an equilibrium of a preemption game, simply compare their thresholds in
equilibrium. A natural guess is that the leader in a preemption game acts earlier
than the information monopoly because traders want to preempt. However, it is
not quite correct. In general, if there is no information externality, then YL = YM ,
and the preemption game requires the leader's threshold YP < YL, hence, YP < YM
in equilibrium. But it is only partially true when there is information externality, in
particular when πL > maxs {πsD − πsF}, which implies that YM = YL = YP . Otherwise,
we only know that YP < YL, but since YM < YL when πL ≤ maxs {πsD − πF,s}, it is
entirely possible to have YM < YP < YL for some cases. Therefore the presence of
information externality causes competing traders delay their information acquisition
possibly because of the second-mover advantage from the information spillover.
Then consider the case where the timing game of information acquisition is a war
of attrition, i.e. L(YL) ≤ F (YL). In the case of a war of attrition, the second-mover
advantage dominates, therefore both traders want to be a follower. Similar to a
standard war of attrition, there can be two pure strategy equilibria: one concedes
at the beginning of the war and the other insists to the end with dierent roles of
players in dierent equilibria. In this timing game, two equilibria are in the similar
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fashion, except that the leader concedes or acquires information not at the beginning
of the game, but at the rst time that is optimal to be a leader, which the other guy
who would become the follower and insists until it is not optimal to wait anymore.
Specically, let us again denote YP < max {Y 0F , Y 1F } to be a point such that L(YP ) =
F (YP ) if it exist, and denote Y∗ = min {YP ,max {Y 0F , Y 1F }}.1
Proposition 2.4.4. Suppose that the timing game is a war of attrition, i.e. L(YL) ≤





(i) τ ∗1 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ YL} and τ ∗2 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ Y∗} , and
(ii) τ ∗1 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ Y∗} and τ ∗2 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ YL} .
Again, we contrast the timing decision of an information monopoly and a leader in
an equilibrium of a war of attrition. This time, as intuitively expected, the leader in
a war of attrition will not acquire information earlier than an information monopoly.
However, the result is slightly stronger. The leader always concedes at YL in any
equilibrium. Because YL ≥ YM and the inequality is strict for some cases, therefore
the leader would acquire information strictly later than an information monopoly
sometimes in the presence of the information externality.
1Note that, if such YP exists, it must be unique by the same argument of Lemma 2.4.4, but if it
does not exist, then Y∗ = max {YF,1, YF,0}.
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Chapter 3





There is plentiful information and traders can acquire information from many sources,
but traders may still have ambiguous beliefs about the value of an asset. We say
a belief is ambiguous if there is no single probability distribution to describe the
uncertainty. The situation of lacking knowledge of a unique probability distribution
is reminiscent of the celebrated Ellsberg (1961) paradox. When agents choose between
bets based on draws from an urn with a known distribution of balls of dierent colors
and an urn with an unknown distribution, they are more likely to choose bets with
known odds over the bets with unknown odds on the same stakes, i.e. they exhibit
ambiguity aversion. This observation is inconsistent with the framework of subjective
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expected utility. Trading an asset is betting on the valuation of the asset. Therefore,
ambiguity aversion can aect the decisions of both traders and market makers when
they have ambiguous beliefs. This motivates us to study the eects of ambiguity
aversion in an order-driven trading mechanism à la Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
Informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) occur when the
agent acts by conforming to the public belief and ignoring the private information.
This informational externalities of the social learning process provides a potential
explanation of widely observed herding behavior. Typically price is necessary to
be inexible so that an information cascade can occur. However, in the Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) trading mechanism, the competitive market maker can learn from the
traders and exibly adjust the price aligning with the public belief. Therefore, it is
generally dicult to generate informational cascades in sequential trading mechanism,
as argued by Avery and Zemsky (1998).
We show that informational cascades can happen in the equilibrium of the sequen-
tial trading mechanism if beliefs are ambiguous about the underlying value of an asset.
If the agent's belief is suciently ambiguous about the value of an asset, then she will
neither buy nor sell this asset for a wide range of prices (see Dow and da Costa Werlang
1992). This no-trade phenomena can also occur in our trading environment. When
the public beliefs are suciently ambiguous, the worst valuation of an agent with a
good private signal is lower than the ask price and the best valuation of an agent with
a bad private signal is higher than the bid price. Therefore, no matter what private
signal an informed trader gets, she will be reluctant to trade and, consequently, an
information cascade on no-trade can occur.
Moreover, ambiguity aversion can reinforce the problem of adverse selection and
contribute to the ask-bid spread. The market maker asks a higher price to sell the
asset and bids a lower price to buy the asset to compensate for their aversion to
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ambiguity. Therefore, when public belief in the market is more ambiguous, the ask-bid
spread becomes wider.
To formalize these ideas, we study a trading environment that is similar to the
special case of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) but with ambiguity averse agents. There
are three types of agent, noise traders, informed traders, and the market maker.
Trading is sequential and it is conducted in an exogenous order. The noise traders
trade inelastically and randomly. The informed traders receive some private signals
about the value of the asset and make their trading decisions rationally. The market
maker is risk neutral and sets ask and bid prices to elicit informed traders to trade
according to their private signals. The multiple prior expected utility (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989) is introduced to capture the ambiguity aversion of both the market
maker and informed traders.
The existence of equilibrium is established in a general model, and we also show
that informational cascades can exist in equilibrium under certain conditions. It is
attributed to ambiguity aversion and is restricted to the case that all the informed
agents choose not to trade because of their aversion to uncertainty. One consequence
of an information cascade is that it overturns the convergence result of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985): Once an informational cascade starts, there is no further information
revealed in the equilibrium path about the value of an asset, and hence, prices stay
the same and ask-bid spreads remain forever.
To fully characterize the equilibrium and illustrate eects of ambiguity aversion in
sequential trading, the general model is simplied to a binary model, where the value
of the asset and the signals are binary. We compare the equilibrium of the binary
models under ambiguity with the model where there is no ambiguity.
Apart from the possibility of informational cascades in equilibrium, a surprising
result is that there could be no equilibrium in pure strategies when there is a certain
level of ambiguity. This is in contrast to the existence of equilibrium in pure trading
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strategies when there is no ambiguity in the binary model. If there is too much
ambiguity, then there will be informational cascades as discussed. The amount of
ambiguity needs to be low enough so that informed traders will buy or sell with
probability one upon receiving a good or bad signal, respectively. However, if the
amount of ambiguity is in between, there can be no equilibrium in pure strategies
and no pricing rule is consistent with market maker's conditions.
The introduction of mixed trading strategy is necessary to guarantee the exis-
tence of equilibrium in the trading environment under ambiguity aversion. When
mixed trading strategies are played in equilibrium, the noise-to-signal ratio of trading
activities is increased. Therefore convergence of beliefs and prices can take much
longer.
The comparative statics of the eect of ambiguity on the ask-bid spread is also
established in the binary model. The ask-bid price widens when there is more
ambiguity in the market. As previously mentioned, to compensate for market maker's
aversion to ambiguity, the ask price will be set higher and the bid price lower when
belief becomes more ambiguous.
A more interesting result emerges when the private signals are ambiguous. If we
assume that initially there is no informational cascade, then the market maker is sup-
posed to set ask and bid prices to elicit informed traders to reveal their private signal
imperfectly. Whenever the private signal is revealed, its ambiguity is added to the
public beliefs. Therefore, the public belief becomes more ambiguous. Consequently,
the market condition would be arbitrarily close to an informational cascade.
Lastly, we consider a binary model with asymmetric binary signals in the sense
that a good signal is more informative than a bad signal under ambiguity. The
informed traders play mixed trading strategies in the equilibrium, therefore informed
traders can also choose not to trade even when there is no informational cascade.
When the bad signal is less informative than the good signal, an informed trader
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with a bad signal is more likely to choose not to trade than an informed trader with
a good signal. Thus, no news is bad news: when no-trade occurs in the market, the
valuation of the asset will decrease.
Briey, from an empirical point of view, the results of this paper can be linked
to some phenomena of trading activities regarding some illiquid assets. For example,
there are some stocks traded with low volume daily and typically they are also barely
analyzed and covered in the media, except for their earnings announcements. Or,
for some other stocks, there are some periods in which trading volume is low and
information about the stock is very limited. Usually, we will see that bid-ask spreads
are wide for these illiquid stocks and that they show no sign of convergence. In such a
scenario, this paper can provide an explanation on the basis of uncertainty aversion.
This paper contributes to relate ambiguity aversion and information cascade in
nancial market. Ambiguity aversion reduces traders' incentive to trade. Dow and
da Costa Werlang (1992) rst show a no-trade under ambiguity. The no-trade is
the key to generate information cascade in this chapter. In the literature, without
the ambiguous information, Avery and Zemsky (1998) conclude the impossibility
of information cascade in sequential trading mechanism. Instead, they introduce
multidimensional uncertainty and show that there can be a herding behavior. Park
and Sabourian (2011) also show that such herding behavior can occur if there are
at least three possible values of an asset. Dierent from information cascade, the
denition of herding in their paper states that traders follow the crowds in the sense
that their trading decisions are altered upon the observation of public history, and
yet there can still be social learning and prices converge to the true value. But
our denition of information cascade follows; social learning stops and prices never
converge to the truth when an information cascade occurs. Some papers also obtain
the information cascade in sequential trading mechanism under other assumptions
such as transaction costs (Lee, 1998), exogenous gains and loss from trade (Cipriani
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and Guarino, 2008), risk aversion of traders and discrete actions (Decamps and Lovo,
2006), and so forth.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 3.2 describes the general specication
of the model, establishes the existence of equilibrium, and show that information
cascades exhibit in some equilibrium. Section 3.3 analyzes a simple example, namely
the binary models, and we contrast the results with and without ambiguity and fully
characterize the equilibrium with mixed trading strategies. Then, Section 3.4 extends
the binary models with mixed trading strategy to show two additional results: (i) The
market tends to be arbitrarily close to an informational cascade if private signals are
ambiguous; and (ii) no-trade sometimes can be informative. Finally, Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 The General Model
We start by describing the trading game of interest, which is similar to that of Avery
and Zemsky (1998) and a special case of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Time is
discrete and denoted by t = 1, 2, . . . , T with T ≤ ∞. Let V ⊂ R+ be a nite (but
non-singleton) set of possible values of an asset, and the true value of the asset v ∈ V
is not observable until the end of period T . Ambiguity for both informed traders and
market maker is introduced in the model à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), that is,
there is not a single probability measure, or belief, to describe the uncertainty, but
a closed and convex set Π1 ⊆ ∆(V ) that collects all the beliefs that agents think
possible. The following is a simple example:
Example 3.2.1. Let's consider V = {0, 1} so that the ∆(V ) is equivalent to [0, 1].
Let Π1 = [π1, π̄1] ⊆ ∆(V ) with π1 < π̄1, where π1 = Pr(v = 1) for all π1 ∈ Π1.
There are three types of agents in the model, a market maker, informed traders,
and noise traders. The trading arrangement is as follow: think of some period t, and
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let history ht and the set Πt(ht) of common beliefs, both of which will be specied
later, be given. First, the market maker posts ask price at and bid price bt. Then the
market marker meets either an informed trader with probability η ∈ (0, 1) or a noise
trader with probability 1− η. Each trader can either buy or sell one unit of asset, or
choose not to trade, recorded as zt = 1,−1, or 0, respectively. To clarify, buy and
sell is dened from the perspective of the trader, not the market maker, e.g. zt = 1
means that a trader buys one unit of asset from the market maker, or, equivalently,
the market maker sells one unit of asset to the trader at the ask price. The noise
traders are assumed to trade for some exogenous reasons and their demand for the
asset is inelastic. Simply they buy, or to sell one unit of the asset, or not to trade
with equal probabilities, i.e. 1/3.
In contrast, the informed traders act rationally and choose the probability of
trading σt = (ζt, ιt) in period t, where ζt and ιt are the probabilities of buying and
selling, respectively. Informed traders are playing mixed strategies instead of pure
strategy, i.e. simply choosing to buy, or sell, or not to trade. Apart from the generality,
this assumption is essential for the existence of equilibrium.
The informed trader who meets the market maker at period t receives an indepen-
dent private signal st ∈ S ⊆ R. Assume that S is a non-singleton and nite set. Let
p(·|·) : S×V → [0, 1] be the conditional probability of signal, i.e. p(s|v) = Pr(st = s|v)
is the probability of signal st = s conditional on that the true value is v. Signals can
also be ambiguous. The informed agent considers a set of conditional probabilities
P , which is closed and convex. That the set P is constant over time can be justied
by the assumption that the ambiguous signals are conditionally independent in the
sense that they are epistemically independent (Couso et al., 1999) conditional on value
v ∈ V of the asset. Loosely speaking, knowing the past signals will not change the
perceived set of conditional probabilities of the future signals. Moreover, the joint
distribution of value v and signal s at period t is Qt = {p× π : π ∈ Πt, p ∈ P}.
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Example 3.2.2. Let's consider that V = {0, 1} and S = {0, 1} and let P = [q, q̄]
where 1/2 < q < q̄ < 1. Two extreme conditional distributions are:
Table 3.2.1: Conditional probabilities
Pr(st = 1|v) Pr(st = 0|v)
v = 1 q 1− q
v = 0 1− q q
Pr(st = 1|v) Pr(st = 0|v)
v = 1 q̄ 1− q̄
v = 0 1− q̄ q̄
Public History, Beliefs, and Equilibrium
The history ht observable to all the agents has length t−1 and contains the sequence
of prices {aτ , bτ}t−1τ=1 and trading orders {zτ}t−1τ=1, i.e. ht = {aτ , bτ , zτ}
t−1
τ=1. Ht denote
the set of all possible histories with length t − 1, and as a convention, history with
length 0 is an empty set, i.e. h1 = ∅.
Without access to private signals, the market marker's pricing strategy xt =
(at, bt) : Ht → R2+ are measurable w.r.t. public histories, where at(ht) and bt(ht)
are the ask and bid prices, respectively, posted at period t; and denote x = (xt)
T
t=1
and X to be the set of all the possible pricing strategies. The informed trader at
period t has the trading strategy σt = (ζt, ιt) : Ht×R2+×S → ∆ that are measurable
w.r.t. history, ask and bid prices, and the private signal received, where ζt(ht, at, bt, st)
and ιt(ht, at, bt, st) are the probabilities of buying and selling, respectively, at period
t following history ht and given the ask at, bid bt, and the private signal st.
1 Denote
Σt to be the set of all the possible trading strategies at period t for informed traders.





Ep×π [ζtu(v − at) + ιtu(bt − v)|ht, at, bt, st] . (3.2.1)
1Here the ∆ denotes the simplex in R3. Since (ζ, ι) ∈ R2, so more precisely ∆ =
{(ζ, ι) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] : ζ + ι ≤ 1} is homeomorphic to a simplex in R3.
81
Let us assume that market maker's objective is to set prices so as to maximize the
min-expected prot of each trade, either a buy or a sell, at each period. To justify
this assumptio, think of that the market maker is myopic (i.e. not considering its
asset position but only caring about the current trade or they are short-lived for only
one period with zero intial exposure to the uncertain asset). Moreover, because of
the competition between market makers assumed in the background, its min-expected
prot has to be zero, hence its equilibrium conditions are just reduced to a set of zero
min-expected prot conditions, i.e.,
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [at − v|ht, at, bt, zt = 1] = 0, (3.2.2)
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [v − bt|ht, at, bt, zt = 0] = 0. (3.2.3)
These set of zero min-expected prot conditions parallel to zero prot conditions of
the market maker in other literature on order-driven tradings: if both P and Π(ht)
are singleton sets, then it reduces to the set of usual zero expected prot conditions.
The belief system Π = (Πt)
T
t=1 is a collection of correspondences Πt : Ht ⇒ ∆(V )
for all t > 1 with set Π1 given, where Πt(ht) denotes the set of public (or common)
beliefs at the beginning of period t following history ht. Given some history ht, t > 1,
a belief πt ∈ ∆(V ) at history ht is consistent w.r.t. π1 ∈ Π1, p ∈ P , and the
strategy prole (x, σ), if it is updated by Bayes rule wherever it is possible. We do






For any t > 1 and any history ht+1 = (ht, at, bt, zt), πt+1 is consistent if, πτ is consistent
for all τ ≤ t and
πt+1(v) =
πt(v) Pr (zt|ht, v)∑
v′ πt(v



















t , st) p(st|v) if zt = −1
.
A remark on notations: if the pricing strategy x is specied, then we denote the
augmented history hxt = (ht, at(ht), bt(ht)), e.g. ζ (h
x
t , st) = ζ (ht, at(ht), bt(ht), st).
The belief system Π is consistent if for every ht and πt ∈ Πt(ht), πt is consistent
w.r.t. some initial belief, conditional probabilities of signals, and strategies, which is
formally dened as follow.
Denition 3.2.1. The belief system Π is consistent w.r.t. Π1, P , and strategy prole
(x, σ), if, for any t > 1 and history ht, for any πt ∈ Πt(ht), there exists some π1 ∈ Π1
and p ∈ P such that πt is consistent w.r.t. π1, p, and (x, σ).
We dene an equilibrium in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, constituted
by a pair of strategies and a belief system, where strategies are best responses given
the beliefs and beliefs are consistent given the strategies.
Denition 3.2.2. An equilibrium of this game consists of a strategy prole (x, σ)
and the system of beliefs Π such that:
(i) given the belief system Π and trading strategy σ, the pricing strategy x satises
the zero min-expected prot conditions (3.2.2) and (3.2.3);
(ii) given the belief system Π and pricing strategy x, the trading strategy σ
maximizes the min-expected utility given any signal st ∈ S, i.e.
σt(h
x




Ep×π [ζtu (v − at(ht)) + ιtu (bt(ht)− v) |hxt , st] ;
(iii) the belief system Π is consistent w.r.t. Π1, P , and (x, σ).
Remark 3.2.1. The conditional probabilities p satises MLRP implies that Pr (·|s′)
rst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) Pr (·|s) if s′ > s.
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Note that FOSD relation is a consequence of MLRP. Example 3.2.2 satises
assumption 2. And either FOSD or MLRP captures that the signals are informative,
i.e. larger signals are better in the sense that they imply higher probability of high
value of the asset.
We characterize the pricing rules of the market maker, which has been extensively
studied in the case without ambiguity, that is, the ask and bid prices are the expected
value of the asset conditional on a buy or a sell in this period, respectively. How-
ever, under ambiguity this result is slightly modied in a way that the determination
of ask and bid prices relies on dierent beliefs in the set of consistent beliefs. The
intuition is that, because of fear of uncertainty, when there is a buy, the market
maker wants to sell the asset at the highest conditional expected value, and, when
there is a sell, the market maker, conversely, wants to buy the asset at the lowest
conditional expected value.
Lemma 3.2.1 (Pricing Strategies). Equilibrium pricing rule xt satises the following
at(ht) = max
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [v|hxt , zt = 1] , (3.2.4)
bt(ht) = min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [v|hxt , zt = −1] , (3.2.5)
for any history ht in equilibrium.
We omit the proof because it follows straightforwardly from equations (3.2.2) and
(3.2.3).
Theorem 3.2.1. There exist an equilibrium (x, σ,Π) for the trading game.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
In Section 3.3, models with binary states and signals are presented. We contrast
the binary models with and without ambiguity: If there is no ambiguity in the market,
then there exists a unique equilibrium where informed trader employ pure strategies,
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however, if there is ambiguity in the market, then there cannot exist an equilibrium
where informed traders only employ pure strategy. It is essential to guarantee the
existence of equilibrium to admit mixed trading strategies by informed traders.
Before further analysis of the properties of an equilibrium, let us impose some
assumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. u is concave and strictly increasing, and u(0) = 0.
Assumption 2. Any conditional probabilities p ∈ P satises the monotone likelihood







whenever s′ ≥ s and v′ ≥ v, with strict inequality if s′ > s, or v′ > v, or both.
3.2.1 Informational Cascade in Equilibrium
The concept of informational cascade, rst termed by Bikhchandani et al. (1992),
says that the informed agent forgoes her private information in the sense that her
optimal decision mimics her predecessor's decision and is independent of her private
signal. Formally, it is dened as follow.
Denition 3.2.3. Given the strategy prole (x, σ), there is an informational cascade
after history ht if the trading strategy of an informed trader at ht is independent of
the private signal, i.e.
σt (h
x





for all st, s
′
t ∈ S.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that it is impossible to have informational cascades
in equilibrium of a trading game without ambiguity. However, it is overturned in a
trading game with ambiguity.
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Given an equilibrium (x, σ,Π), it induce a probability distribution onHt, for all t ≤
T , and is denoted by Pr(·;x, σ,Π). Let the supportHt(x, σ,Π) = {ht ∈ Ht|Pr (ht;x, σ,Π) > 0}
denote the history before period t that is reachable in the equilibrium (x, σ,Π), or
the equilibrium path, and ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π) is a history in equilibrium. Our analysis,
especially analysis of informational cascades, will focus on the equilibrium path of the
game.
First, there cannot be any no informational cascade where all informed traders
buy or sell with strictly positive probability.
Proposition 3.2.1. For any equilibrium (x, σ,Π), there does not exist any ht ∈
Ht(x, σ,Π) such that:
1. ζt(h
x
t , st) = ζ for all st ∈ S; or
2. ιt(h
x
t , st) = ι for all st ∈ S
for any ζ, ι > 0.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
However, there is still possibility of informational cascade on not trading, i.e.
ζt(h
x
t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0. Indeed, there is a sucient and necessary condition
regarding the set of public beliefs for an informational cascade on no trading.
Proposition 3.2.2. Given some equilibrium, there is an informational cascade at



























where s = minS, s̄ = maxS. Moreover, in this informational cascade,
ζt(h
x
t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0
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for all st ∈ S.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
The necessary and sucient condition in the Proposition 3.2.2 is somewhat di-
cult to interpret. Therefore, we give Theorem 3.2.2, which is simply an implication
of Jensen's inequality. However, it provides a easy-to-verify and easy-to-interpret
sucient condition that guarantees the informational cascades on not trading.
Theorem 3.2.2. Given some equilibrium (x, σ,Π), there is an informational cascade
at some history ht, in which ζt(h
x
t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st ∈ S, if
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [v|ht, s̄] ≤ max
π∈Π(ht)
Eπ [v|ht] , and (3.2.6)
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [v|h,t , s] ≥ min
π∈Π(ht)
Eπ [v|ht] . (3.2.7)
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
For example, look at the inequality (3.2.6): If the dierence between maxπ∈Π(ht) E
π [v|ht]
and minπ∈Π(ht) E
π [v|ht] is large, which means that the ambiguity in the market is
large, and if the dierence between minp∈P,π∈Πt(ht) E
p×π [v|ht, s̄] and minπ∈Π(ht) Eπ [v|ht]
is small, which means that the informativeness of the signal is relatively small, then
typically the inequality will hold. In the binary model studied in Section 3.3, it is
more clear how this type of informational cascade arises when the ambiguity is greater
than the informativeness of the signal.
3.2.2 The Characterization of Equilibrium
First, the next proposition just extends the result of endogenous positive ask-bid
spread into this ambiguous trading game.
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Proposition 3.2.3. In an equilibrium (x, σ,Π), for every ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π),
at(ht) > bt(ht).
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
Here, we will briey comment on the asymptotics of the equilibrium. It may
be interesting to know whether it can be the case that the market tends to an
informational cascade when the private signals are ambiguous when it starts out
with no informational cascade. This is possible because the ambiguity of the private
signals is adding to common beliefs. However, proving this in the general model is a
dicult task. Instead, we will show this in the binary model with ambiguous signals
in Section 3.4. Nevertheless, in the case that there is an informational cascade, the
dynamics of the prices and beliefs will simply be constant.
Corollary 3.2.1. Given an equilibrium (x, σ,Π), if there is an informational cascade
after history ht in equilibrium, then there are informational cascades for all histories
hτ , τ ≥ t, that follow history ht in equilibrium, and the equilibrium ask bid spreads,
a(hτ )− bτ (hτ ), remains constant, for all τ ≥ t, and strictly positive.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
To characterize an equilibrium, there can be either informational cascade or no
cascade in each round of trading. When there is no cascade, the trading decisions in
equilibrium are monotonic, that is, it can be describe as such: there are two crucial
signals, s∗ > s and s∗ < s̄, with s∗ < s
∗, and the active informed traders will buy the
asset if her private signal is at least s∗ and sell the asset if her private signal is no
more than s∗, where the determination of s
∗ and s∗ depends on the set of common
beliefs at that period.
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Theorem 3.2.3. In any equilibrium (x, σ,Π), given any ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π), note that
one of the following cases must hold:
(i) ζt(h
x
t , st) = 0 and ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0 for all st ∈ S (informational cascade), or





= 0 ∀s < s∗t
> 0 s = s∗t
= 1 ∀s > s∗t
or





= 1 ∀s < st∗
> 0 s = st∗
= 0 ∀s > st∗
;
and (ii) and (iii) can hold simultaneously with st∗ < s
∗
t .
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
3.3 The Binary Model
In this section, we study some simplied version of the model and call them binary
models because the set V of the possible value of the asset and set S of possible signals
are assumed to take only two values, i.e. V = S = {0, 1}. Moreover, T is set to be
innity, and, to simplify the analysis, the utility functions of the informed agents are
assumed to be linear, i.e. u(x) = x; hence, they are risk neutral. First, we present the
model without ambiguity, where there exists a unique equilibrium with pure trading
strategies and informational cascade is impossible in equilibrium. Then, ambiguity is
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introduced in the minimal way. Under ambiguity, there can be informational cascade
and equilibrium may not exist if traders only employ pure trading strategies. Hence,
mixed trading strategies are essential to guarantee the existence of equilibrium.
3.3.1 The Binary Model without Ambiguity
Without ambiguity, the information structure in the basic model is simple. Initially,
there is only one initial common belief π1 = Pr(v = 1), and there is only one
conditional distribution of a symmetric binary private signal,
p(1|1) = p(0|0) = q,
with q > 1/2, so that the signal structure satises MLRP, or intuitively, 1 is a
good signal since it implies higher valuation of the asset and, conversely, 0 is a bad
signal. Moreover, let's now assume that the traders can only choose pure strategy,
i.e. the investment decision ẑt ∈ Z = {−1, 0, 1}. This is equivalent to restrict the
probabilistic trading strategies chosen within the degenerate distributions of actions,
i.e. σ(ht, at, bt, st) ∈ {(0, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0)}.
The market maker's conditions are reduced to the conventional zero expected
prot conditions, and the equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if we assume
that the zero expected prot conditions are derived from prot maximization problem
under competition. Therefore, the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium is then, a pair
of strategies and beliefs, such that, given the belief system π = (πt)
T
t=1, the price
strategies, sequence of functions {at, bt : Ht → R+}, satises the zero expected prot
condition and trading strategies, sequence of functions
{
ẑt : Ht × R2+ × {0, 1} → Z
}
,
maximizes the informed agent's expected payo for those who are active at period t,
and beliefs are consistent in the sense that the conditional beliefs {πt : Ht → [0, 1]}
satisfy the Bayes rule wherever it is possible.
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Given history ht and the public belief πt(ht) at the beginning of period t, or simply
denoted as πt; and π
(·)





πtp(st|1) + (1− πt)p(st|0)
.
Hence, the interpretation of π
(st)
t is the posterior belief given prior πt and signal st.
Trading games of this specication have been studied extensively in the previous
literature. There is detailed analysis in Avery and Zemsky (1998), and the binary
model here follows closely the exposition in Chamley (2004). First, there exists
some equilibrium for this trading game. And, in the equilibrium, the market maker
typically post dierent ask and bid prices, which generates endogenous bid-ask spread.
Moreover, in the equilibrium, informed traders separate themselves by trading orders:
traders with good signal (i.e. st = 1) will buy the asset and traders with bad signal
(i.e. st = 0) will sell the asset. These features are then summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3.1. The equilibrium exists. Moreover, in equilibrium,
(i) π
(0)





t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1,
for every history ht.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
First, we can show that it is only possible for the informed trader to buy with a
good signal and sell with a bad signal, as (ii) in the Proposition 3.3.1. Anticipating
this, consequently, the market maker's conditions would be
1− η
3
(at(ht)− πt) + η [πtq (at(ht)− 1) + (1− πt)(1− q)at(ht)] = 0
1− η
3
(πt − bt(ht)) + η [πt(1− q) (1− bt(ht))− (1− πt)qbt(ht)] = 0,
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+ πtq + (1− πt)(1− q)




πt + πt(1− q)
1−η
3η
+ πt(1− q) + (1− πt)q
∈ (π(0)t , πt), (3.3.2)
and hence (i) in the proposition follows.
Then, as a corollary, there cannot be informational cascade in the equilibrium path
since the informed traders will trade dierently upon receiving dierent signals. In
general, it is true that if there is no ambiguity then there is no informational cascade.
Else, other properties of the equilibrium, such as the dynamics of the public belief
and prices, are the same as that in the previous literature. Especially, the public
belief πt is a martingale in equilibrium. Without informational cascades, private
information is revealed, in the long run, as Glosten and Milgrom (Proposition 4,
1985), so that πt will converge to the true value almost surely. Moreover, there is
an endogenous bid-ask spread, however, both at and bt will also converge to the true
value, and bid-ask spread will converge to 0, almost surely.
Finally, Figure 3.3.1 illustrates an example of the dynamics for prices and the
public beliefs, where we set v = 1, η = 0.5, π1 = 0.5 and q = 0.6. It can be seen that
the convergence of prices and beliefs typically happens after roughly 250 rounds of
trading.
3.3.2 The Binary Model with Ambiguous Prior
In this section, ambiguity is introduced in the binary model. If the amount of
ambiguity is low, as the case where there is no ambiguity, the equilibrium will be
just like the one in the previous section. However, otherwise we will see two quite
dierent results compared with the situation without ambiguity: If the amount of
ambiguity is suciently large, then the equilibrium exhibits informational cascades.
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Figure 3.3.1: A sample path of prices and beliefs without ambiguity
When the amount of ambiguity is somewhat in between, we will see that surprisingly
there cannot be any equilibrium with pure trading strategies.
First, the public beliefs are ambiguous. Initially, instead of one common belief,
there is a set of common beliefs as Example 3.2.1, Π1 = [π1, π̄1] with π1 < π̄1. For
notation matters: given some belief system Π, for any Πt(ht), let πt = min Πt(ht) and
π̄t = max Πt(ht). π
(s)







t |πt ∈ Πt(ht)
}
.
The notion of equilibrium (with pure strategies) here is consisting of pricing strategies
xt = (at, bt) : Ht → R2+ , trading strategies ẑt : Ht → {−1, 0, 1}, and the belief
system Π as dened in the general model, such that pricing strategies solves the zero
min-expected prot condition as that in the general model, and trading strategies are
optimal given prices and private signal, and the belief system is consistent.
Then, the public beliefs Πt(ht) in each period will be typically a set, and the
trading strategies will be slightly dierent from that in the previous section. Notice
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Especially, given the private signal s, if least optimistic valuation of the trader is less




then the informed trader with signal s will not buy the asset, and if the most optimistic




then the informed trader with signal s will not sell the asset. So when both hold,
there will not be any trading orders from that informed trader. But if either one of
the above inequalities is reversed, then the trader will trade in the favorable direction.
This proves the following lemma that summarizes the pure trading strategies under
ambiguity.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Pure Trading Strategies). For the informed trader, who is active










and not to trade is optimal if and only if
min Π
(s)
t ≤ at(ht) and max Π
(s)
t ≥ bt(ht).
Before further analysis of the equilibrium, the following lemma is useful to show
that, in the equilibrium, there can be only two situations: one is an informational
cascade with no trade, and the other is just like the case without ambiguity, i.e.
traders separating themselves in trading upon receiving dierent signals.
Lemma 3.3.2. For every history ht in equilibrium (with pure strategies), trading
orders {ẑt} satises one of the following conditions:
(i) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 0; or
(ii) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
The following proposition states that, when the public beliefs are ambiguous
enough, then there has to be an informational cascade. The intuition is as follow.
Suppose that we have informational cascade, specically no informed traders trading
given the prices with any private signal, then because of zero min-expected prot
condition, the ask and bid prices will be set to be π̄t and πt, respectively. If the
public beliefs are very ambiguous in the sense that the dierence between π̄t and
πt is large, then it is possible to have π
(1)
t ≤ π̄t = at(ht) and π̄
(0)
t ≥ πt = bt(ht),
i.e. the worst valuation with a good signal is still less than the ask price and the
best valuation with a bad signal is still greater than the bid price. Hence, no matter
what the signal is, it is truly optimal for all informed traders not to trade, that is,
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an informational cascade hits the market. Consequently, since no information can
be revealed in a cascade, the public beliefs are not changing any more. So, in next
period, the same situation repeats itself; and informational cascades persist forever.
Proposition 3.3.2. In an equilibrium, Πτ (hτ ) = Πt(ht) and
ẑτ (h
x
τ , sτ ) = 0







Proof. Let the equilibrium be given.
(Only if part.) In period t, let
ẑt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st ∈ {0, 1}.
Then the market maker's condition gives that at(ht) = π̄t and bt = πt.
And since ẑt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st, by optimality of the strategy in equilibrium, it is
equivalent to the following inequalities:
π
(1)
t ≤ at(ht) = π̄t (3.3.4)
π̄
(1)
t ≥ bt(ht) = πt (3.3.5)
π
(0)
t ≤ at(ht) = π̄t (3.3.6)
π̄
(0)
t ≥ bt(ht) = πt (3.3.7)
Since that π̄
(1)
t > π̄t > πt and π
(0)
t < πt < π̄t by informativeness of the signal,
i.e. q > 1/2, inequalities (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) hold for sure. So we only need that
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inequalities (3.3.4) and (3.3.7) hold, and it turns out that both of them are equivalent
to (3.3.3).
(If part.) Given the inequality (3.3.3), we shall see that it cannot be the case that
ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x





1− q + γ
q + γ
, with q > 1/2,
where γ = 1−η
η
> 0, contradictory to the inequality (3.3.3). Then, by Lemma 3.3.2,
it must be the case that ẑt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st. Then, we have that, for all v,




if zt 6= 0
1−η
3
+ η if zt = 0
.
Note that, therefore,
Πt+1(ht, at, bt, zt) =
{
π Pr (zt|ht, 1)
π Pr (zt|ht, 1) + (1− π) Pr (zt|ht, 0)
: π ∈ Πt(ht)
}
= {π : π ∈ Πt(ht)}
= Πt(ht)
for all at, bt, and zt. And then the rest of the proof is done by induction.
How can we interpret the inequality (3.3.3)? Note that π
1−π is a strictly increasing




, which captures how dierent the best and worst beliefs are and provides a
concrete measurement of the amount of ambiguity in the common set of beliefs. In the
right-hand side, q
1−q ∈ (1,∞) also measures the accuracy of the signals. Therefore,
the inequality essentially says that the amount of ambiguity of the public beliefs is
greater than the accuracy of the signals. And it is sucient and necessary for having
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informational cascades in equilibrium. Moreover, once the informational cascade
starts, it will last forever, and the bid-ask spread will not converge. The bid-ask
spread purely depends on how dierent the best and worst beliefs are since it is exactly
the dierence of them. Such an equilibrium with informational cascades exists. We
can think of such a game with Π1 satisfy the inequality (3.3.3), then informational
cascade start at period 1 and last forever, which is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3.1. If Π1 satises inequality (3.3.3), then there exists an equilibrium
where there is an informational cascade in each period, moreover, the bid-ask spread
never vanishes.
Next we consider when it is possible to have the equilibrium resembling that of no
ambiguity in the previous section. That is, the informed trader buys the asset if she
receives a good signal and sells if receiving a bad signal. Such condition given in the
following proposition is again very intuitive, it states that the amount of ambiguity of
the public beliefs should be small enough to induce the informed trader to separate
themselves in the trading with dierent signals received.
Proposition 3.3.3. In an equilibrium, given ht in period t,
ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1





1− q + γ
q + γ
(3.3.8)




Proof. (Only if part.) Given ht, if ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1, then market
maker's conditions yields that
at(ht) =
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
(3.3.9)
bt(ht) =
πtγ + πt(1− q)









t ≥ at(ht), (3.3.11)
ẑt(h
x




t ≤ bt(ht). (3.3.12)





1− q + γ
q + γ
.
(If part.) For this direction, from Lemma 3.3.2, suppose, for contradiction, it is
not ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1. Then it must be that ẑt(hxt , s) = 0 for s ∈ {0, 1},







which is contradictory to the inequality 3.3.8 since
1− q + γ
q + γ
< 1
implied by q > 1/2 and γ > 0.
Look at the inequality (3.3.8). The left-hand side is the same as the inequality

















, and this condition just restricts that the amount of ambiguity
should not exceed the ratio of the informativeness of a signal and that of a trading
order. It also makes clear that when there is no ambiguity, the left-hand side is equal
to one, so the inequality always holds, and thus informed traders are separating in
the equilibrium.
Moreover, the inequality (3.3.8) tells us something about the role of the noise
traders in the market. When the fraction of the noise traders is higher (γ is higher),
it is more likely for the informed traders to trade according to their private information
in equilibrium because it is easier for them to hide their order behind the noisy orders.
This indicates that noise traders are actually facilitating nancial trading.
We still leave some important questions open at the moment, especially, how the
beliefs evolve over time and whether the equilibrium always exists with pure trading
strategies. For the rst question, we refer to a later result, Proposition 3.3.6. In
fact, the key measurement of ambiguity, π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
, is constant in any equilibrium of
a trading game with non-ambiguous private signals. Therefore, by checking whether
π̄1(1−π1)
π1(1−π̄1)




, we are able to know that
there will be equilibrium where there are informational cascades or not.
However, in contrast to the results of trading games without ambiguity, a trading
game with ambiguity does not always have an equilibrium in pure trading strategies.
Inspecting the inequalities (3.3.3) and (3.3.8), they are not forming an exhaustive
description of the possible set of common beliefs. Since
q
1− q






because q > 1/2 and γ = 1−η
3η
> 0. However, for some arbitrary set Πt of the common
beliefs, it can be the case that
q
1− q









If there is an equilibrium in pure trading strategies, then there cannot be any history
ht in equilibrium such that Πt(ht) satises the inequality (3.3.13).
Lemma 3.3.3. There does not exist any history ht in equilibrium with pure trading
strategies such that the inequality (3.3.13) hold for Πt(ht).
Proof. Given an equilibrium, suppose, for contradiction, there is such a history ht in
equilibrium. By Lemma 3.3.2, we will have either (i) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 0 or (ii)
ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1. But in each case, as shown by Proposition 3.3.2 and
3.3.3, Πt(ht) will not satisfy inequality (3.3.13). This is the contradiction.
As a corollary of Lemma 3.3.3, there cannot be any equilibrium with the inequality
hold for Π1. If there is such an equilibrium, it will contradict to the lemma. So we
have the following proposition without repeating the proof.
Proposition 3.3.4. Suppose that Π1 satises inequality (3.3.13), then there is no
equilibrium in pure trading strategy.
However, in Section 3.3.3, when traders play mixed trading strategies, there does
exist an equilibrium.
3.3.3 The Binary Model with Mixed Trading Strategy
As showed in the general model, allowing mixed strategy brings back the convexity
of the strategy space, therefore, from the point of view of a xed point argument for
existence of equilibrium, it is sucient to guarantee the existence of equilibrium for
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any set of common beliefs. Moreover, we will use the results in Thereom 3.2.3 to fully
characterize the equilibrium in the binary model with ambiguous priors.
Let us think of an environment similar to that in Section 3.3.2 except for that we
allow traders to play mixed strategies. To remind readers, as in the general model, a
mixed strategy for informed agent t, is σt : Ht ×R2+ × S → ∆, where σt = (ζt, ιt) and
ζt(ht, at, bt, s) = Pr (zt = 1|ht, at, bt, s) ,
ιt(ht, at, bt, s) = Pr (zt = −1|ht, at, bt, s) .
Then, this just a special case of the general model, so by applying Theorem 3.2.1,
there must be an equilibrium for this game. This equilibrium strategy is unique and
characterize this equilibrium in the binary model. Following Theorem 3.2.3, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.4. It must be case that
ζt(h
x
t , 0) = 0, ζt(h
x
t , 1) ≥ 0 and
ιt(h
x
t , 0) ≥ 0, ιt(hxt , 1) = 0
for any history ht in equilibrium.
Proof. For history ht in equilibrium, there can be either an informational cascade or
not. From Corollary 3.2.3, if there is informational cascade in equilibrium, then it
must be the case that ζt(h
x
t , 0) = ζt(h
x




t , 1) = 0. Otherwise,
we must have s∗t = 1 and st∗ = 0. Hence, in this case, will have ζt(h
x
t , 0) = 0,
ζt(h
x
t , 1) > 0 and ιt(h
x
t , 0) > 0, ιt(h
x
t , 1) = 0.
Given this lemma, we can focus on the analysis of possible values of ζt(h
x
t , 1) and
ιt(h
x
t , 0) only. From the earlier section, we have known the case where ζt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
and ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0 is in fact the informational cascade, and the case where ζt(h
x




t , 0) = 1 is the separating equilibrium. Moreover, as a matter of fact, thanks
to the symmetry assumption, ζt(h
x
t , 1) and ιt(h
x
t , 0) are also equal when inequality
(3.3.13) holds.
More importantly, if inequality (3.3.13) holds in equilibrium, then the market
maker will post the prices that make the informed traders just indierent between
trading or not and the informed traders must play strictly mixed trading strategies.
Let's focus on the intuition of setting the ask price, at = π
(1)
t . Given the inequality
(3.3.13), it implies that π
(1)
t > π̄t. So if the market maker sets the ask price slightly
above π
(1)
t , then no informed trader will come to buy the asset, then it makes a strictly
positive prot from a buy. But the failure of zero min-expected prot implies the
pressure of competition will drive the price down, and hence the market maker will
not set an ask price above π
(1)
t . More subtly, it is impossible to set ask price below
π
(1)
t either because that will contradict with the zero min-expected prot as well.
Suppose so, from Lemma 3.2.1, to avoid expected loss, the market maker has to set
ask price to be at least greater than π
(1)
t when inequality (3.3.13) holds. Along with
the analysis before, this gives us a complete picture of how should be the pricing and
trading decisions look like in any history in equilibrium for dierent sets of common
beliefs, which are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.5. In any equilibrium, given history ht in equilibrium and Πt(ht),
then we have the following:
(i) there exists a unique σ(ht) ∈ (0, 1) such that
ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x








if and only if
q
1− q












t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0,
at(ht) = π̄t,
bt(ht) = πt,









t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 1
at(ht) =
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
,
bt(ht) =
πtγ + πt(1− q)
γ + πt(1− q)− (1− πt)q
,





1− q + γ
q + γ
.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
Belief updating
Proposition 3.3.5 only prescribes the trading and pricing strategies. However, to fully
characterize the equilibrium, we need to also specify the consistent beliefs. Moreover,
understanding the evolution of beliefs enables us to answer questions like whether it
is possible to switch from non-cascade to an informational cascade.
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Specically, the public belief, or the set of common beliefs, is updated through
the observable to the public, or the information contained in the public history, i.e.
the ask, at, and bid, bt, and trading orders, zt. Given the equilibrium strategies, the
conditional probabilities of a buy at history ht is








and the conditional probabilities of a sell at history ht is








Dene the likelihood ratio function lt : Z → R+ by lt(zt) = Pr(zt|ht,v=1)Pr(zt|ht,v=0) . Then, given







for all πt ∈ Πt(ht), specically for π̄t and πt as well. Therefore, Πt+1(hxt , zt) can be
characterized by
{









and we have the following proposition that tells that π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
, the measurement of
ambiguity, is constant in the market over time.







for all t = 1, 2, . . . and history ht in equilibrium.
Proof. First, x an equilibrium and ht. Note that by the information structure, for
an arbitrary zt ∈ Z, use lt as short for lt(zt).





πt Pr(zt|ht, v = 1)
πt Pr(zt|ht, v = 1) + (1− πt) Pr(zt|ht, v = 0)
=
π̄t Pr(zt|ht, v = 1)


























and rest of the proof done by mathematical induction.
The Characterization of equilibrium
The Proposition 3.3.6 shows that π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
is constant along the equilibrium path.
Therefore, informed agent's decision in period t, t > 1, will be exactly the same as
that in period 1. Then we can construct the equilibrium as follow. For the pricing
strategies, we rst compute π̄1(1−π1)π1(1−π̄1)
. If inequality (3.3.8) holds, then prices are set
as equations (3.3.9) and (3.3.10) as functions of Πt(ht) in each period t, and given
these prices the informed trader will buy fore sure with a good signal and sell for
sure with a bad signal. If it is the case that inequality (3.3.13) holds, we set price
as at(ht) = π
(1)
t and bt(ht) = π̄
(0)
t . Consequently, the informed traders are indierent
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between not to trade and to buy with good signal and indierent between not to
trade and to sell with a bad signal. So the informed traders choose the probability
of not trading to make the market maker's zero min-expected prot conditions hold.
Finally, if inequality (3.3.3) holds, then prices are set as at(ht) = π̄t and bt(ht) = πt,
and the optimal decision for informed traders is never to trade. In these three cases,
consistent belief are constructed in the way that described as before, specically, in
the last case it turns out that Πt = Π1 for all t. We can verify that this construction
satises all the conditions to be an equilibrium, and it also characterizes the unique
equilibrium strategies. In fact, in each case there cannot be other ways to price the
asset to satisfy all the equilibrium conditions, so this construction has to be what an
equilibrium outcome looks like. We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.7. Given a trading game under ambiguity, there can be one of the
following equilibria:
(i) a pure separating equilibrium, where, for all t ≥ 1 and ht in equilibrium,
ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 1
ζt(h
x
t , 0) = ιt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
at(ht) =
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
bt(ht) =
πtγ + πt(1− q)
γ + πt(1− q)− (1− πt)q
and beliefs evolve as (3.3.14) if and only if inequality (3.3.8) holds for Π1;
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(ii) a mixed separating equilibrium, where there exists a unique σ ∈ (0, 1) such
that, for all t ≥ 1 and ht in equilibrium,
ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = σ
ζt(h
x
t , 0) = ιt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
at(ht) = π
(1)
t and bt(ht) = π̄
(0)
t
and beliefs evolve as (3.3.14) if and only if inequality (3.3.13) holds for Π1;




t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0
ζt(h
x
t , 0) = ιt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
at(ht) = π̄1 and bt(ht) = π0
and Πt = Π1 for every t ≥ 1 if and only if inequality (3.3.3) holds for Π1.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
Here, we can extend the Proposition 4 of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and the
Proposition 4 Avery and Zemsky (1998) in an ambiguous environment but only when
there is no informational cascade. If π̄1(1−π1)π1(1−π̄1)
< q
1−q , then the equilibrium prices at and
bt will converge to v and ask-bid spread will converge to 0 almost surely. Otherwise,
in the case of informational cascade, π̄1(1−π1)π1(1−π̄1)
≥ q
1−q , the equilibrium prices will be
constant, and ask-bid spread is strictly positive and never converges to 0.
Figure 3.3.2-3.3.4 illustrate three dierent types of equilibria. We set v = 1, η =
0.5, and q = 0.6 in all examples and choose dierent π̄1 and π1 so that conditions for
dierent types of equilibria hold. We can see that in the pure separating equilibrium,
Figure 3.3.2, it is not much dierent from the case without ambiguity. In the mixed
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Bounds of belief sets
Figure 3.3.2: Binary model with ambiguous initial priors (π1 = 0.47,π̄1 = 0.53)
separating equilibrium, Figure 3.3.3, although convergence is predicted by theory,
it may take extraordinary long time. In this sample path, there is no any sign of
convergence even after 1000 rounds of trading. Lastly, in the informational cascade
equilibrium, Figure 3.3.4, everything is just as predicted to be a straight line.
Comparative Statics of Ambiguity
How does ambiguity in market itself aect the ask-bid spread? Consider two public




t(ht) is said to be more ambiguous
than Πt(ht) if Π
′
t(ht) ⊂ Πt(ht). In fact, the more ambiguous relation dened here
is consistent with the measurement of ambiguity π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
mentioned beforehand.







the following result shows that, loosely speaking, the ask-bid spread is increasing in
ambiguity.




t(ht)) be the equilibrium ask and bid
prices corresponding to the beliefs Πt(ht) and Π
′
t(ht), respectively. If Π
′
t(ht) is more
ambiguous than Πt(ht) , then a
′
t(ht)− b′t(ht) > at(ht)− bt(ht).
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Bounds of belief sets
Figure 3.3.3: Binary model with ambiguous initial priors (π1 = 0.46,π̄1 = 0.54)
Time


















Bounds of belief sets
Figure 3.3.4: Binary model with ambiguous initial priors (π1 = 0.445,π̄1 = 0.555)
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Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
Intuitively, when the market maker is ambiguity averse, it will push up the ask
price and press down the bid price to compensate its aversion to ambiguity. When
there is more ambiguity in the market, this force of enlarging ask-bid spread is
stronger. Hence, uncertainty aversion reinforces the problem of adverse selection
in the sequential trading, and more uncertainty induces larger ask-bid spread.
3.4 Extensions of the Binary Model
3.4.1 Ambiguity in the Private Signals and the Asymptotics
of Equilibrium
In this section, we further consider the binary trading game with ambiguous private
signals. In Section 3.3, the equilibrium in binary model with ambiguous prior is
not so interesting in the sense that there cannot be any switch of dierent types of
equilibrium: either there are informational cascades from st period on, or there is no
informational cascade forever because the key measurement of ambiguity is constant
in the equilibrium path. However, when ambiguous private signals are introduced in
the model, the ambiguity of the common beliefs will grow because the ambiguity of
private signals is added into it whenever the trading orders reveals the information
of the private signals imperfectly.
Formally assume that the signal structure is the one in Example 3.2.2. It is like
the previous sections that the binary signal is symmetric and characterized by some





with q < q̄. First, we extend some notations: π(s,q) denote the
updated belief, or the posterior, given prior π and signal s and under the conditional
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distribution q, and let
π(s,q) =
π Pr(s|1; q)




q if s = 1









t |πt ∈ Πt(ht), q ∈ {q, q̄}
}
.
Here also consider the mixed trading strategies to guarantee the existence of
equilibrium. In an equilibrium, depending on the set Πt(ht) of common beliefs. there
can be three situations, which looks just similar to the cases without ambiguity in
signals, except that the thresholds are changed to capture this new ambiguity.
First, if there is an informational cascade, i.e. ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0, then prices
would still be at(ht) = π̄t and bt(ht) = πt. To make the trading decision optimal, we
shall have at(ht) ≥ π
(1,q)
t and bt(ht) ≤ π̄
(0,q̄)






Secondly, if it is the pure separating case, i.e. ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x




γ + π̄tq̄ + (1− π̄t)(1− q̄)
, and
bt(ht) =
πtγ + πt(1− q̄)
γ + πt(1− q̄)− (1− πt)q̄
.
112
To make this trading decision optimal, we shall have at(ht) ≤ π
(1,q)
t and bt(ht) ≥ π̄
(0,q̄)
t .





1− q̄ + γ
q̄ + γ
. (3.4.2)
Thirdly, for the mixed separating case, we will have ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = σt ∈
(0, 1), then prices would be at(ht) = π
(1,q)
t and bt(ht) = π̄
(0,q̄)
t . To make the trading
decision optimal, we shall have
π̄tγ/σt + π̄tq̄
γ/σt + π̄tq̄ + (1− π̄t)(1− q̄)
=
πtq


















However, the above just tells us about what the pricing and trading decision would
be in particular history ht in equilibrium. The next proposition shows that the set of
common beliefs now evolves in a way that the measurement of ambiguity is increasing
over time.





, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . ,
with the inequality being strict if zt 6= 0 and π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t) <
q
1−q .
Proof. The probability of a buy or a sell is ambiguous now, for example, Pr(zt =
1|ht, v = 1) can be either 1−η3 + q̄σ or
1−η
3
+ qσ, where σ ∈ [0, 1]. or equivalently, we
have multiple likelihood ratio function lt(·; q) : S → R+, depending on the value of q,
dened by
lt(zt; q) =
Pr(zt|ht, v = 1; q)
Pr(zt|ht, v = 0; q)
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where the conditional probabilities are dened as before, but we emphasize its depen-
dence on q. If zt = 0, then lt(zt; q) ≡ 1. Otherwise, lt is strictly increasing in q when
zt = 1 and decreasing in q when zt = −1.



























































As said before, when private information is revealed, albeit not perfectly, the
ambiguity accompanied by the private signal is also injected into the public beliefs.
Notice that if inequality (3.4.1) holds at period t, the probability of trading σt = 1
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is independent of specic values of the set Πt(ht), and thus
lt(zt;q)
lt(zt;q̄)
> 1 is xed, if
zt 6= 0. therefore, heuristically, when periods is longer enough, it is almost surely that
π̄t(1−πt)
πt(1−π̄t)




, of playing mixed trading strategy in






1−q , the probability of
trading σt depends endogenous on the specic value of the measurement of ambiguity,
and it converges to 0 as π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
increases towards q
1−q , and the likelihood ratio
lt(zt;q)
lt(zt;q̄)
converges to 1 for zt 6= 0. Therefore, at the rst glance, it is not clear whether π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
will pass the threshold q
1−q to enter the stage of informational cascade. We conclude
that this possibility is null, showed in the next proposition, with calculation of σt
explicitly, nevertheless, π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
converges to q
1−q almost surely in equilibrium.













for all t = 1, 2, . . .; however, π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
converges to q
1−q as t→∞ almost surely.
Proof. In the Appendix to Chapter 3.
Although an informational cascade cannot occur along the equilibrium path, the
convergence result is still useful to show that the public beliefs of the market can be
arbitrarily close to the situation where there is an informational cascade. Therefore,
the trading decisions can be arbitrarily close to that of an informational cascade when
there are sucient long periods to accumulate ambiguous signals. To formalize this
idea, we dene an ε-informational cascade by that the dierence of trading decisions
across dierent types of agents is very small. Formally, Let ‖ · ‖ be the sup-norm.
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Denition 3.4.1. Given the strategy prole (x, σ) and ε > 0, there is an ε-informational
cascade after history ht if
‖σt (hxt , st)− σt (hxt , s′t)‖ < ε
for all st, s
′
t ∈ S.
Then, we can state this asymptotic result as the following theorem. We can
conjecture that this will be also true in the general model since the general idea
should also apply there.
Theorem 3.4.1. If the signals are ambiguous in the binary model, then there will be
an ε-informational cascade as t→∞ almost surely for any ε > 0.
Proof. Fix ε > 0. We can see that there is an ε-informational cascade if and only if
∣∣∣∣ π̄t(1− πt)πt(1− π̄t) − q1− q
∣∣∣∣ < δε
for some δε > 0. By Proposition 3.4.2, this event happens as t→∞ almost surely.
At the end of this part, there is another sample paths, Figure 3.4.1, attached to
illustrate the dynamics of prices and beliefs in the model with ambiguous signals. Due
the fact that signal is ambiguous and not too accurate (q = 0.6 and q̄ = 0.61), we can
see that after several hundreds rounds of trading, it then looks like an informational
cascade. In fact, we can think of that the market enter some ε-informational cascade
with this ε smaller than the machine epsilon in the computer.
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Bounds of belief sets
Figure 3.4.1: Binary model with ambiguous signals (v = 1, Π1 = {0.5}, q = 0.6,η =
0.8)
3.4.2 Asymmetric Signals: No News is Bad (Good) News
One consequence of the existence of equilibrium with mixed trading strategies is that
it is possible for informed traders not to submit any order to the market maker.
However, when the signals are symmetric as in Section 3.3, no trade at period t, i.e.
zt = 0, is still not informative in the sense that the set of conditional probabilities
of v conditional on zt = 0 is the same as the public belief Πt(ht). To see this, for
any belief π ∈ Πt(ht), we denote the posterior Prπ(v = 1|zt = 0) the updated belief
conditional on observing zt = 0 with prior belief π. Let ζ̂ and ι̂ be the equilibrium
trading strategy, so that ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = σ ∈ [0, 1] by Proposition 3.3.7. Then,
Pr (z = 0|v = 1) = 1− η
3




+ η(1− σ) = Pr (z = 0|v = 0) ,
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t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) in every possible equilibrium, and this is pri-
marily driven by the fact that the signals are symmetric. However, if the signals are
asymmetric, then the no-trade itself can be informative especially when ζt(h
x
t , 1) 6=
ιt(h
x
t , 0). Mowever, ζt(h
x
t , 1) 6= ιt(hxt , 0) is only possible when there is ambiguity in
the market. Let's consider a model similar to that in Section 3.3, but assume that
binary signals are aymmetric,
q1 = Pr(s = 1|v = 1) > Pr(s = 0|v = 0) = q0.
Then the following proposition shows that informed traders respond to good and bad
signals asymmetrically under certain condition and thus no-trade would be informa-
tive in the sense that the set of conditional probabilities of v conditional on zt = 0 is
dierent from the public belief Πt(ht).







1− q0 + γ
q0 + γ
, (3.4.3)
then 0 ≤ ιt(hxt , 0) < ζt(hxt , 1) ≤ 1 and Prπ (v = 1|z = 0) < π for all π ∈ Πt(ht).
Note that since Prπ (v = 1|z = 0) < π for all π ∈ Πt(ht), it must be the case that
Πt+1 (h
x
t , zt = 0) 6= Πt (ht) because Prπt (v = 1|z = 0) < πt.
We omit the formal proof Proposition 3.4.3, but refer to the following discussion
of the equilibrium in the binary model with asymmetric signals. First, if there is an
















In the informational cascade, all the buy or sell orders comes from the noisy traders
and all the informed traders choose to not to trade, no activity is informative. On





1− q0 + γ
q0 + γ
,
informed traders with a good signal will buy the asset and traders with a bad signal
will sell, i.e. ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 1, in equilibrium, which also nests the case where
there is no ambiguity. In this case, since ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0), no-trade is still not
informative.









then it is possible to have that ζt(h
x
t , 1) > 0 but ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0, i.e. only informed
traders with a good signal will buy the asset, none of the orders will come from
informed traders with a bad signal. When
q0
1− q0







1− q1 + γ
q1 + γ
, (3.4.5)
we will have ζt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 but ιt(h
x
t , 0) < 1, i.e. all the informed traders with a good
signal will buy the asset, while informed traders with a bad signal will sell the asset













informed traders optimally choose that 0 < ιt(h
x
t , 0) < ζt(h
x












then both inequality (3.4.4) and (3.4.5) hold, and informed traders optimally choose
that ζt(h
x
t , 1) = 1 and ιt(h
x
t , 0) = 0, i.e. all the informed traders with a good signal will
buy the asset, but none of the traders with a bad signal will sell. Hence, in equilibrium,
we always have ζt(h
x
t , 1) > ιt(h
x
t , 0) since the good signal is more accurate than the
bad signal. Moreover, for the last case, it is interesting because informed trader will
only buy, and no sell will come from the informed traders. Consequently, no-trade
lead to a decrease in the valuation of the asset, but a sell order does not.
In these cases, no-trade, zt = 0, becomes informative here since it hints that it is
more likely to be resulted from some informed trader with a bad signal because the
bad signals are less informative. Therefore, when no-trade occurs, the valuation of
the asset will decrease in the market: No news is bad news when the bad signal is
less informative. Conversely, if the good signal is less informative, i.e. q1 < q0, then
no news is good news. The valuation of the asset will increase when no-trade occurs
because it is more likely that informative traders with a good signal choose not to
trade.
3.5 Conclusion
When the public belief is ambiguous and agents are ambiguity averse, informed traders
and market maker behave dierently from situation where there is no ambiguity.
Informed traders may be reluctant to trade due to their aversion to uncertainty, which
can lead to informational cascade. The fundamental reason for such informational
cascade is dierent from that of Bikhchandani et al. (1992), where informational cas-
cade relies on the dierence between the public belief and xed investment cost. But,
in the asset trading environment, the cost of investment is adjusting and reecting
the public beliefs. Therefore, the informational cascade here is in fact a status quo
bias as a consequence of aversion to uncertainty. And such phenomenon is robustly
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attributed to ambiguity aversion, by which I mean that the results will be largely
preserved even if we further generalize the model, for example, having a continuum
set of the value of the asset, and/or allowing trading volume to be positive real
numbers.
The market maker tend to ask for high selling prices and bid for low buying prices
of the asset if they are ambiguity averse and the public belief is ambiguous. The
ambiguous the market maker, the larger the ask-bid spread. The need for the market
maker to be compensated for their aversion to ambiguity widens the ask-bid spread
and worsens the problem of adverse selection.
One of the reasons that we can think of the common belief is ambiguous can be
traced to the fact that the private signals are ambiguous. When the informed traders
trade relying on ambiguous private information, although there is new information
assimilated into the market, the ambiguity accompanied that piece of information is
also injected to the public beliefs.
The fact that ambiguity keeps the informed traders away from trading has sig-
nicant consequences. It makes the market fail to incorporate every information
owing around eectively if the informed trader is not trading. When there are
much ambiguous private information owing around in the market over extensively
long periods, the beliefs would become too ambiguous for informed traders to trade
suciently frequently. It will either take super long periods to make belief to converge
to some rational expectations, or beliefs are just stay there and trading activities
are purely random. Therefore, the results reasonably cast doubts on the ecient
market hypothesis and rational expectation assumptions, especially when there is
much (Knightian) uncertainty in the market.
Since the informed traders can play mixed trading strategies in equilibrium under
ambiguity, no-trade can also be informative because it is less likely for the informed
trader with a specic signal to place any order. As shown in the paper, if the bad
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signal is less informative than the good signal, then informed traders with a bad signal
are less likely to trade. No news, i.e. no trade in the market, is bad news because
it is more likely resulted from a bad signal. But conversely, if the good signal is less
informative than the bad signal, then informed traders with a good signal are less
likely to trader and thus no news is good news.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs in Chapter 1
Proof of Theorem 1.2.1.
Proof. The proof is done by a guess-and-verify procedure. First, we guess that p =
1
R
(A+Bθ − Cζ) and solve the undetermined constants A, B, and C.























































λ−1a πθ,ada, Π̂ζ =
∫ 1
0
λ−1a πζ,ada, Σ̂θ =
∫ 1
0







λ−1a πz,ada = Π̂ζ + Σ̂ζ . The RHS is π̂
′(A+Bθ−Cζ), and hence, we have
Σ̂θ +D
2Π̂z
DΠ̂z −DΣ̂ζ + 1
= D
⇐⇒ Σ̂ζD2 −D + Σ̂θ = 0.
so we can solve D and a real solution exists if and only if ∆ = 1 − 4Σ̂ζΣ̂θ ≥ 0.
Moreover, by Vieta's Theorem, there must be a strictly positive root when Σ̂ζ > 0.
When Σ̂ζ = 0, there always exists a positive root.
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Then, with some D > 0,
π′a = πθ,a + σθ,a +D
2πz,a
= πθ,a + σθ,a +D































Then, we have expressions of x = A/C and c = C/R.






can also constitute an equilibrium price p = c(x− ζ) that clears the market.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1.
Proof. Fix some asset market equilibrium D. As a corollary of Proposition 1.2.1,











and switching the integral and expectation operator and using the martingale prop-








a] da− ζ̄ = π̂′θ̄ − ζ̄ ,
and denote p̄ = E [p̃],
RHS = π′p̄R,
and hence,
θ̄ − p̄R = ζ̄/π′ (A.1.2)
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The objective function UDa
(
σθ,a, σζ,a; Σ̂θ, Σ̂ζ
)












by plugging in the optimal portfolio in the equilibrium and removing the constant
term. Note that (θ′a − pR) ∼ N (ma, Va) where
ma = Ea [θ
′
a − pR]
= θ̄ − p̄R
= ζ̄/π̂′
by equation (A.1.2) and use V ar [x] = E [V ar [x|y]] + V ar [E [x|y]], we have
Va = V ara [Ea [θ − pR|sa, za, p]]
= V ara [θ − pR]− Ea [V ara [θ − pR|sa, za, p]]
= (1−B)2/πθ,a + C2/πζ,a − 1/π′a
Denote Θa = V
−1/2
a (θ′a − pR) the Sharpe ratio and it has a normal distribution with
unit variance, so Θ2a ∼ χ(1, V
−1/2

















































where La = (1 − B)2/πθ,a + C2/πζ,a. Note that UDa depends on σθ,a and σζ,a only






































Hence, we can replace the objective with π′a = πθ,a + σθ,a +D
2 (πζ,a + σζ,a).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2.
Proof. Suppose that (σθ,a, σζ,a)a∈[0,1] and D = 0 be an overall equilibrium. From
Proposition 2.3.1, individual's problem would be max(σθ,a,σζ,a)∈Ka {πθ,a + σθ,a}, hence
the only optimal choice is that σθ,a = max {σθ,a|(σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka} > 0 if the agent can
learn the payo. Since the set of agents who can learn the payo is strictly positive,
it then must be the case that Σ̂θ > 0, by Theorem 1.2.1, D has to solve equation
(1.2.11). But D = 0 cannot be a solution to that equation when Σ̂θ > 0. This reaches
a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that the set of agents who can learn the payo is measure
zero. We can construct an overall equilibrium where D = 0. If the agent cannot learn
the payo, they have to choose σθ,a = 0 since σa = 0 for every (σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka, but
they can choose some σζ,a > 0. If the agents can learn the payo, then they choose
(σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka such that σθ,a = max {σθ,a|(σθ,a, σζ,a) ∈ Ka}. Since the set of agents
who can learn the payo is measure zero, it is the case that Σ̂θ = 0 and Σ̂ζ > 0.
Then, we can verify that D = 0 can be supported in this overall equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2.
Proof. Proof is simply verifying the equilibrium conditions. We will prove (i) only,
the proof of (ii) is similar.
Given µ∗(πθ,a) = 1 for all πθ,a ∈ suppF , Σθ = (H − 1)Πθ and Σζ = 0; hence,
D = (H − 1)Πθ/λ. So µ∗(πθ,a) = 1 for all πθ,a ∈ suppF if and only if (H − 1)Πθ/λ ≤√








⇐⇒ π̄θπζ ≤ λ2/(H − 1)2.
So the conclusion follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3.
Proof. Suppose that µ∗(π̄θ) = 1 and µ
∗(πθ) = 0 is an equilibrium. Then,
Σθ = α(H − 1)π̄θ,











λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
2(1− α)(H − 1)πζ
.








for some D as above.






λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ






⇐⇒ 2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ ≤ ±
√
λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ (A.1.4)
≤ 2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ.
Then, we look at three cases when λ2−4α(1−α)(H−1)2π̄θπζ ≥ 0, which is equivalent









λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
⇐⇒
[
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ







λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ ≤ 2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ
=⇒ λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ ≤
[












(H−1)2 ≤ π̄θπζ .
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Case (ii):
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ ≤ −
√
λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
=⇒
[
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ














λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
⇐⇒
[
2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ















4α(1− α)π̄θπζ ≤ maxα∈[0,1] 4α(1− α)π̄θπζ = π̄θπζ .
Case (iii):
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ < −
√
λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
=⇒
[
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ
]2








λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ < 2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ
=⇒ λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ <
[




















has a lower bound 4α(1− α)π̄θπζ . Moreover, we also know that
2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ < −
√
λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ ≤ 0



































λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ < 2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ





α(1− α)π̄θπζ < (1− α)
√
π̄θπζ
=⇒ α < 1/2.





















< α < 1
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(H−1)2 ≤ π̄θπζ implies that either√







λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ ≥ 2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ.
However, the latter is impossible because it implies that
2(1− α)(H − 1)
√
π̄θπζ − λ ≤ −
√
λ2 − 4α(1− α)(H − 1)2π̄θπζ
≤ 2(1− α)(H − 1)√πθπζ − λ
=⇒ π̄θ ≤ πθ.
And the former implies D ≤
√
π̄θ/πζ . And case (ii) and (iii) are proved similarly.
Proof of Lemma 1.4.1.
Proof. Let (σθ,a, σζ,a) and D be a separating equilibrium. Because the linearity of the
objective function and shape of the information entropy constraint set. The individual
problem can be reduced to choose between two end points as discussed. It is optimal
to choose to learn the payo if πθ,a ≥ D2πζ and to choose to learn the supply if
πζ,a ≤ D2πζ . Hence, we have this π∗θ = D2πζ .
Proof of Lemma 1.4.2.
Proof. The only if part follows directly the above text. To show the if part, we can
simply verify that such xed point π∗θ is a separating equilibrium. By the analysis in
the text, we see that π∗θ is a root of G(π) = 0 implies that one real solution for the
equation ΣζD
2 − λD + Σθ = 0 must be
√




and Σζ = (H − 1)πζF (π∗θ). Moreover, it is apparent that µ∗(πθ) = 0 if πθ < π∗θ ,
µ∗(πθ) = 1 if πθ ≥ π∗θ is optimal if agents coordinate on that asset market equilibrium√
π∗θ/πζ .
Proof of Proposition 1.4.4.
Proof. Suppose that π̄θπζ < λ









< 0, Then by continuity, there exists a π∗θ ∈ (πθ, π̄θ) such
that G(π∗θ) = 0. Then it is a separating equilibrium by Lemma (1.4.2). Moreover, it is
unique followed by monotonicity because it must lie on the decreasing segment of the
G function. The proof for the case of Πθπζ/πθ < λ
2/(H − 1)2 < π̄θπζ is similar.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.5.
Proof. Note that G(0) = Πθ > 0, G
′(0) = −∞, and limπ→∞G(π) = ∞. The strict
convexity of G ensures that there exists a unique π̊θ = arg minπ G(π) and it must
be strictly positive because of G′(0) = −∞. In fact, it satises G′(̊πθ) = 0, which
gives Equation (1.4.12). Then, by continuity and convexity of G, G is continuous
and decreasing on [0, π∗] and increasing on [̊πθ,+∞), hence, if G(π∗) < 0, then
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there must exist a point π∗θ on (̊πθ,+∞) and another point π∗θ on (0, π̊θ) such that
G(π∗θ) = G(π
∗
θ) = 0. If G(̊πθ) = 0, then π̊θ has to be the only zero point of G since it
is the only minimum. If G(̊πθ) > 0, then there cannot be any zero point of G.
Proof of Proposition 1.4.6.
Proof. Let π∗,1θ and π
∗,2




θ . From the
proof of Proposition 1.4.5, we show that there is one separating equilibrium π∗,1θ on
[̊πθ,+∞) and another separating equilibriumπ∗,2θ on [0, π̊θ]. And by the denition of
π̊θ = arg minπ G(π) and properties of G that we state in the proof of Proposition 1.4.5.
G is strictly increasing on [̊πθ,+∞) and decreasing on [0, π̊θ], therefore, G′(π∗,1θ ) > 0
and G′(π∗,2θ ) < 0. Then, we have
















The separating equilibrium π∗θ characterized by the root of G(π) = 0, i.e. π
∗
θ , λ,
and H jointly satisfy:
J(π∗θ , λ,H) =
∫ π̄θ
π∗θ



























From inequality (A.1.5) and (A.1.6), it implies that ∂π∗,1θ /∂λ > 0 and ∂π
∗,2
θ /∂λ < 0.
With similar argument, it is easy to see that the comparative statics of separating
equilibria with respect to H is exactly opposite: ∂π∗,1θ /∂H < 0 and ∂π
∗,2
θ /∂H > 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.5.1.
Proof. Suppose that λa is bounded below by λ > 0 and Ka is bounded above by
(σ̄θ, σ̄ζ) for almost every agent. λ ≥ 2
√
σ̄θσ̄ζ implies that λ
−2σ̄θσ̄ζ ≤ 1/4, ThenΣ̂θΣ̂ζ ≤
λ−2σ̄θσ̄ζ ≤ 1/2. This guarantees that the correspondence Γ dened in Section 1.3 has
the same domain and range. Then follow the proof of Theorem 2 in Rath (1992), we
can apply Kakutani's xed point theorem to show there exists some xed point of Γ.
By Lemma 1.5.1, there exists an equilibrium.
136
A.2 On the Information Constraint
Linear Constraints
One type of constraint considered by Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) and
Kacperczyk et al. (2016) is an additive constraint.
σθ,a + σζ,a ≤ Ha. (A.2.1)
The interpretation for this constraint is that the learning technology is analogous to
a sequence of independent draws of either a payo or a supply signal with precision
δ. Each independent draw of a normally distributed signal adds precision δ to the
posterior belief. Constraining the sum of incremental precisions of the posterior belief
not exceeding Ha is equivalent to restrict the total number of draws on payo and
supply signals to be N ≤ Ha/δ.
If the constraint is linear, no matter what heterogeneity is introduced, the equi-
librium will be either all-fundamentalist or all-chartist in most cases. There is a
knife-edge case of mixing equilibrium only when the asset market equilibrium D = 1.
Quadratic Constraints
Another possible information constraint studied by Farboodi and Veldkamp (2016) is
a quadratic constraint,
(πθ,a + σθ,a)
2 + χ (πζ,a + σζ,a)
2 ≤ Ha. (A.2.2)
This constraint captures idea that it is getting tougher and tougher to acquire more
and more precise information about a given random variable, while the total cost of
acquiring two dierent types of information is additive.
If the constraint is quadratic, information has decreasing returns. In the case
that agents are homogeneous, there will be still multiple equilibria, but it is not
guaranteed that the equilibrium is at the corners of the constraint set and it is most
likely individual learn both type information in the equilibrium. With heterogeneity
in prior precision introduced, the equilibrium will still be monotone, but decreasing
in πθ,a, because of the decreasing return of information.
The shaded area in the Figure 1.3.1 depicts some examples of the three types
of information constraint sets discussed above. Then main distinctions among them
is the convexity of the constraint sets. The entropy-type constraint has a convex
complement, while the quadratic constraint set itself is convex. Though the solutions
to constraint optimization problems also depends on the objective function, the
entropy-type constraint more likely admits corner solutions. And this is exactly the




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs in Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1.










where β and β′ are two roots of the quadratic equation λ = 1
2













Note that we have a boundary condition for the value function M(0) = 0 so that it
has to be that A2 = 0. Moreover, the standard value matching (B.1.1) and smooth




































Then, the problem is solved and the solution is as stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2.
Proof. Suppose that θ̂2 > 0 or q < 1, then
πsD − πF,s = p(1− p) [θ2 − (2q − 1)θ0] /ρs > 0
for both s = 1 and 2. Applying similar solution method in the proof of Proposition
2.3.2, we obtain the value function
F s(y) =










y < Y sF ,
yπsD
λ








and the timing decision
τ sF = inf {t ≥ 0|Yt ≥ Y sF} .
Moreover, if θ̂2 = 0 and q → 1 or θ̂2 → 0 and q = 1, then (πsD − πF,s) → 0 and
consequently YF,s →∞ and τF,s →∞.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1.
Proof. The second part obviously follows the equation (2.2.11). Let's focus on the
rst part. We will show the case that Y 1F > Y
0





First, I claim that




































To see this, we exploit the equivalence of an optimal stopping problem to a problem
choose threshold directly.
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Then, we can apply the envelop theorem and plug the expression of π's and ρ:
∂
∂q











Y 1F p(1− p) [θ2 − (2q − 1)]
λ










Y 0F p(1− p) [θ2 − (2q − 1)]
λ






























































where the rst inequality follows from Y 1F > Y
0
F , which also implies that 2p− 1 ≥ 0,
and the second inequality is due to that y ≤ Y sF and β > 1 implies that (y/Y sF )
β Y sF ≤
y.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2.
Proof. I will show the rst statement, and the argument for the other statements is
proved in the similar way and hence omitted.
Suppose now 1/2 < p < 1. First, we note that ρ1 = pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) =
(1 − q) + (2q − 1)p is increasing in p given that q ≥ 1/2 and ρ = 1/2 if p = 1/2.
Hence, we must have ρ ≥ 1/2. Therefore, ρ1 ≥ ρ0, and
π1D − π1F =
p(1− p) [θ2 − (2q − 1)θ0]
ρ1
≤ p(1− p) [θ2 − (2q − 1)θ0]
ρ0











= Y 0F .
































∂ (π0D − π0F ) /∂q
(π0D − π0F )2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Proof. First, V satises the dierential equation λV = 1
2
σ2y2V ′′, and, along with the
boundary condition V (0) = 0, we know it has a general solution V (y) = ALy
β. So

































































Y 0F ≤ YL < Y 1F .
.











< min {Y 0F , Y 1F }, it is necessary and sucient to have πL > maxs {πsD − πsF}.





does satisfy the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions.











≥ Y 1F ;














< YF,0 because we can show that
πL+πD
2
> π0D − π0F : First,
πL ≥ πD and πF ≥ 0
=⇒ πL ≥ πD − 2πF
=⇒ πL + πD
2
≥ πD − πF ;
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moreover, note that πD−πF = p1 (π1D − π1F )+p0 (π0D − π0F ) and Y 0F < Y 1F implies that
π1D−π1F > π0D−π0F , hence, π1D−π1F > πD−πF > π0D−π0F . Therefore, πL+πD2 > π
0
D−π0F .
And similar analysis applies to the case that Y 0F ≤ YL < Y 1F .
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1.
Proof. First, note that q = 1/2, F (y; 1
2
) = S(y) for all y ≥ 0. Therefore, the
conclusion follows Lemma 2.3.1.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2.
Proof. First, we note that πF = π
s
F = 0 and πD = π
s
D for s = 0, 1. Moreover












< YF since θ̂1 > θ̂2 ≥ 0.

















































where, for last inequality, we show that f(x) = (β − 1)xβ − βxβ−1 + 1 is decreasing
in x when 0 < x < 1 and f(1) = 0. Note that
f ′(x) = β(β − 1)xβ−2(x− 1) < 0
when 0 < x < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
Proof. First, we note that if q = 1, then π1D = πD,1 and π
0
D = πD,0. Therefore,














− c y < Y sF
0 y ≥ Y sF
.
142
We consider the case where πL > maxs {πsD − πsF}. Note that in this case
πL > π
1
D − π1F ⇐⇒ 2pθ1 > θ̂2
πL > π
0
D − π0F ⇐⇒ 2(1− p)θ1 > θ̂2.














































































< 1 is necessary and sucient for L(YL) − F (YL) < 0 in
this case.






[Y 1F , Y
0
F ]. Then, L
1
1(YL)− F 1(YL) = 0 and























































< 1 is necessary and sucient for L(YL)−F (YL) <
0. The case where πL ≤ π0D − π0F is similar, so we omit it.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.4.
Proof. This follows the fact that φ(y) = L(y)−F (y) is strictly concave on [0,max {Y 0F , Y 1F }],
which has at most two zero points, φ(0) < 0, φ(YL) > 0, φ (max {Y 0F , Y 1F }) = 0.
First, we can verify that L′ is strictly decreasing in y and F ′ is strictly increasing in
y on [0,max {Y 0F , Y 1F }], therefore, L and −F are strictly concave, so that φ is concave
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on this region. Moreover, φ(0) = −c < 0. φ(YL) > 0 by assumption. Hence there
must exists some YP ∈ (0, YL) such that φ(YP ) = 0. Moreover, since we know that
φ (max {Y 0F , Y 1F }) = 0, this YP has to be unique, otherwise it contradicts with the
concavity of φ.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.3.
Proof. First, we show that the strategy prole (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) is an equilibrium by showing
that take τ ∗−i = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ YP} as given, τ ∗i = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ YP} is a best
response. Consider agent i is choosing some threshold Yi.
If y ≥ YP , choosing the threshold Yi ≤ y will not change the outcome. Moreover,





−i, y) = [L(y) + F (y)] /2 ≥ F (y) = Ui(τ ∗i , τ ∗−i, y),
for all y > YP .
Suppose that y < YP . Then choosing the threshold Yi > YP will not change the
outcome. Moreover, i has no incentive to choose the threshold Yi < YP because in that
case Ui(τi, τ
∗



















is strictly increasing in Yi when Yi ∈ [0, YL].
Hence, we can conclude that τ ∗i is a best response.
Second, we rule out the possibility of other equilibrium of this class. Suppose we
have another equilibrium such that τi = inf {t : Yt ≥ Yi} and τ−i = inf {t : Yt ≥ Y−i}
with either Yi or Yj does not equal to YP or neither of them equal to YP , and we will
nd possible deviations for all the following cases.
Case 1: Suppose Yi ≤ Y−i < YP . When y = Y−i, by choosing some Y ′i > Y−i, the
trader i can increase her expected payo since F (Y−i) > L(Y−i).
Case 2: Suppose Yi < YP ≤ Y−i. When y = Yi, by choosing Y ′i = YP , the trader i
will have expected payo
Ui(τ
′















L(Yi) is strictly increasing when Yi < YL.
Case 3: Suppose YP = Yi < Y−i. When y = Yi, i will choosing some Y
′
i ∈
(Yi,min {YL, Y−i}), so her expected payo will increase for the same reason as case 2.
Case 4: Suppose YP < Yi ≤ Y−i. When y = Yi − ε, for some ε > 0 small enough,
choosing some Y ′−i = Yi − ε, change of the trader −i's expected payo is






note that since limε→0 ∆U−i(ε) > 0 and it is continuous, so when ε > 0 small enough,
we will have ∆U−i(ε) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.4.
Proof. We will show (i) is an equilibrium, and the proof for (ii) being an equilibrium
is similar and hence omitted.
Given that τ ∗1 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Y
y
t ≥ YL}. When y > YL, then trader 2 is indierent
because he will get follower's value any way. When y = YL, the only non-trivial
deviation is to choose τ2(YL) = 0, however, in this case, the change of trader 2's
expected payo will be [L(YL)− F (YL)] /2 ≤ 0 since F (YL) ≥ L(YL), so she does
not strictly prefer to this deviation. When y < YL, i.e. trader 1 has not acquired
information, trader 2 is indierent for choosing the threshold Y2 > YL since he will
always get the follower's value when trader 1 acquires information. And trader 2 does
not strictly prefer to acquire the information at the same time of trader 1. To see
this, suppose trader 2 choose τ2 = inf {t ≥: Y yt ≥ YL}, then
U2(τ
∗
1 , τ2, y) = E
[
e−λτ2













since L(YL) ≤ F (YL). Moreover, trader 2 does not prefer to lead. To see this, suppose
trader 2 choose τ2 = inf {t : Yt ≥ Y2} for some Y2 < YL, then
U2(τ
∗






L(y) if y ≥ Y2
(y/Y2)
β L(Y2) if y < Y2
,
and since (y/Y )βL(Y ) is strictly increasing in Y when Y ≤ YL, it must be the case
that U2(τ
∗




1 , τ2, y) < (y/YL)
βL(YL) ≤ (y/YL)βF (YL) = U2(τ ∗1 , τ ∗2 , y).
Now given that τ ∗2 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ Y∗}. When y ≥ Y∗, if trader 1 choose to
deviate to τ1 = inf {t ≥ 0 : Y yt ≥ Y1} for some Y1 > Y∗. Then, her expected payo is
F (Y∗) is equal to that of τ
∗
1 , which is [L(Y∗) + F (Y∗)] /2 since F (Y∗) = L(Y∗). When
y < Y∗, the optimal solution for trader 1's stopping problem is to choose τ
∗
1 , hence
she has no incentive to deviate.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Additional Proofs in Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
Notice that for each round of trading, the pricing strategies and trading strategies
are directly responding to the public beliefs Πt(ht), and the inter-period linkage of
the game is just through the evolution of beliefs. Hence, rst we consider each period
of the game as a stage game. Or equivalently, given some Π ⊆ ∆(V ), let us consider
a stage game to be a one-shot trading game, that is, a trading game with T = 1. So
we rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma C.1.1. There exists an equilibrium in a stage game for any beliefs Π ⊆ ∆(V ).
Proof. First note that a and b will be chosen only from [v, v̄]2 where v = minV and
v̄ = maxV , implied by Proposition 3.2.1.





Ep×π [ζu(v − a) + ιu(b− v)|s]
satises the hypothesis of the Maximum Theorem (Berge, 1959), moreover,
min
p∈P,π∈Π
Ep×π [ζu(v − a) + ιu(b− v)|s]
is concave and ∆ is convex, therefore the solution correspondence, σ : [v, v̄]2×S ⇒ ∆
is non-empty-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.
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Next, we dene the following correspondence Γ : [v, v̄]2 ⇒ [v, v̄]2 by that, for any
(a, b) ∈ [v, v̄]2,
Γ(a, b) =
{
(â, b̂) ∈ [v, v̄]2 |∃σ̂(a, b, ·) : S → ∆ s.t.









Ep×π [v|z = −1; ι̂(a, b, ·)]
}
.
Then, we verify that Γ is non-empty-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemicontinu-
ous.
Non-empty-valued. For any (a, b) ∈ [v, v̄]2, σ(a, b, s) is non-empty-valued for all
s ∈ S, therefore, we can always pick some σ̂(a, b, s) ∈ σ(a, b, s) for all s ∈ S. Given
this σ̂, Ep×π
[
v|z = 1; ζ̂(a, b, ·)
]
and Ep×π [v|z = −1; ι̂(a, b, ·)] continuous and both P
and Π are compact, there must exist some (â, b̂).
Convex-valued. For any (â, b̂), (ã, b̃) ∈ Γ(a, b), we want to show that (aλ, bλ) ∈
Γ(a, b) for any λ ∈ (0, 1) where (aλ, bλ) = λ(â, b̂) + (1 − λ)(ã, b̃). That is, we want
to nd some σλ(a, b, ·) satisfy the conditions. So the σλ can be constructed as follow:
let σ̂ and σ̃ be one corresponding trading strategy to (â, b̂) and (ã, b̃), respectively.
Consider the following function of λa ∈ [0, 1],
f(λa) = min
p∈P,π∈Π
Ep×π [aλ − v|z = 1; ζλa(a, b, ·)] ,
note that aλ ∈ (â, ã) (wlog assuming â < ã), and since minp∈P,π∈Π Ep×π [aλ − v|z = 1; ζλa(a, b, ·)]











ã− v|z = 1; ζ̃(a, b, ·)
]
= 0
and f(1) > 0 analogously, so there exists λa ∈ (0, 1) such that f(λa) = 0 by continuity.
Similarly, there exist unique λb such that
g(λb) = min
p∈P,π∈Π
Ep×π [bλ − v|z = 1; ιλa(a, b, ·)] = 0.
The last step is to show that [ζλa(a, b, s), ιλb(a, b, s)] ∈ σ(a, b, s) for all s, where ζλa =
λaζ̂ + (1 − λa)ζ̃ and ιλb = λbι̂ + (1 − λb)ι̃. Note that ζ(a, b, s) can be either 0, or 1,
or [0, 1] in each case ζλa(a, b, s) ∈ ζ(a, b, s), similarly, ιλb(a, b, s) ∈ ι(a, b, s), moreover,
ζλa + ιλb ≤ max
{
ζ̂ + ι̂, ζ̃ + ι̃
}
≤ 1; so we have the conclusion as desired.
Upper hemicontinuity. Let (an, bn)
∞
n=1 ⊆ [v, v̄]
2 be a sequence such that limn(an, bn) =
(a, b) and (ân, b̂n)
∞
n=1 ⊆ [v, v̄]
2 with (ân, b̂n) ∈ Γ(an, bn) and limn(ân, b̂n) = (â, b̂), we
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want to show that (â, b̂) ∈ Γ(a, b). Note that for each (ân, b̂n), there is a corresponding
function σ̂n(a, b, ·) and since (σ̂n)∞n=1 ⊆ ∆3, which is compact, so there exists a limit σ̂
of its some subsequence, moreover, since σ(a, b, s) can be show is closed, so σ̂(a, b, s) ∈
σ(a, b, s), and by continuity, we will have minp∈P,π∈ΠE
p×π [aλ − v|z = 1; ζλa(a, b, ·)] =
0 and minp∈P,π∈ΠE
p×π [bλ − v|z = 1; ιλa(a, b, ·)] = 0, hence, (â, b̂) ∈ Γ(a, b) as desired.
With closed the domain and compact range, upper hemicontinuity is equivalent
to have closed graph, hence, we can apply Katutani xed point theorem, that is, Γ
has a xed point, i.e. there exists some (a, b) ∈ [v, v̄]2 such that (a, b) ∈ Γ(a, b).
Proof of the theorem
Proof. Given Π ⊆ ∆(V ), let x [Π] = (a [Π] , b [Π]) and σ [Π] : [v, v̄]2 × S ⇒ ∆ denote
the equilibrium of a stage game with belief Π ⊆ ∆(V ). Then the equilibrium of the
trading game is constructed as follow inductively:
In period 1, x1 = x [Π1] and σ1 = σ [Π1], and it induces a set of conditional
probabilities Q1(π) = {Pr(z1|v; π, p) ∈ ∆| p ∈ P} by xing some π ∈ Π1.
In period 2, we have h2 = (a1, b1, z1), then
Π2(h2) =
{
π′ ∈ ∆(V )|π′(v) = π(v) Pr(z1|v; π, p)∑
v π(v) Pr(z1|v; π, p)
),
for some π ∈ Π1 and Pr(z1|v; π, p) ∈ Q1(π
}
,
then x2(h2) = x [Π2(h2)] and σ2(h2, a, b, s) = σ [Π2(h2)] (a, b, s), and again it induces
a set of conditional probabilities, Q2(π;h2) = {Pr(z2|v, h2; π, p) ∈ ∆| p ∈ P} by xing
some π ∈ Π2(h2).
In general, in period t > 1, ht = (ht−1, xt−1(ht−1), zt−1(ht−1)), then
Πt(ht) =
{
π′ ∈ ∆(V )|π′(v) = π(v) Pr(zt|v, ht; π, p)∑
v π(v) Pr(zt|v, ht; π, p)
,
for some π ∈ Πt−1(ht−1) and Pr(zt|v, ht; π, p) ∈ Qt(π;ht)
}
,
then xt(ht) = x [Πt(ht)] and σt(ht, a, b, s) = σ [Πt(ht)] (a, b, s), ∀a, b, s, and it induces
a set of conditional probabilities, Qt(π;ht) similarly dened as before.
So at every history ht, the above dened strategy prole satises the equilibrium
conditions by verifying that in each stage game with belief Πt(ht) given. Moreover,
by the inductive denition of Π, it is clearly consistent. Hence, above dened strategy
prole and belief system constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
First, we show the following lemma.
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Lemma C.1.2. In an equilibrium (x, σ,Π), the trading strategy σ satisfy the following
property: given a history ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π),
(i) if ζt(h
x
t , st) > 0 for some st ∈ S, then ζt(hxt , s′t) = 1 for all s′t > st;
(ii) if ιt(h
x
t , st) > 0 for some st ∈ St, then ιt(hxt , s′t) = 1 for all s′t < st.
Proof. We will only show (i) and the proof of (ii) is similar. The proof simply relies
on the Remark 3.2.1.
Note that ζt(h
x
t , st) > 0, by optimality, implies that
min
π,p




Eπ×p [u (bt(ht)− v) |ht, st]
}
.
Fix arbitrary s′t > st. Fix arbitraryπ, q, since Pr (v|ht, s′t; π, q) FOSD Pr (v|ht, st; π, q)
by Remark 3.2.1,
Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, s′t] > Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, st] ;




Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, s′t] > min
π,p
Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, st] ;
min
π,p
Eπ×p [u (bt(ht)− v) |ht, s′t] < min
π,p
Eπ×p [u (bt(ht)− v) |ht, st] .
Hence, we have that
min
π,p
Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, s′t] > min
π,p


















t) = 1 and, since s
′
t is arbitrary, it holds for all s
′
t > st.
Proof for the proposition
Proof. The proof of (ii) would be similar, so we just prove (i) here. There can be two
cases, one is that ζ < 1 and other is that ζ = 1. But by the above lemma, ζ < 1 is
not possible. Suppose, that for all signal st, 0 < ζt(h
x





t) = 1 > ζt(h
x
t , st) for some xed st < maxS, a contradiction.
Moreover, it is not possible for ζ = 1, either. Given some equilibrium (x, σ,Π),
suppose, for contradiction, there is some history ht ∈ Ht (x, σ,Π) such that ζt(hxt , st) =
1 for all st ∈ S. Then, we can show that Pr (v|zt = 1, ht) = Pr (v|zt = −1, ht) = π(v),
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Then, from informed trader's strategy, it must be the case that
min
π,p
Eπ×p [u (v − at(ht)) |ht, s] ≥ 0,
where s = minS, then, by Jensen's inequality, it implies that
min
π,p
Eπ×p [v − at(ht)|ht, s] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ min
π,p
Eπ×p [v|ht, s] ≥ max
π∈Π(ht)
Eπ [v|ht] .
However, given Assumption 2, we can show that Pr (v|ht; π) = π(v) FOSD Pr (v|ht, s; π, p)
for any π, p; hence, we have
Eπ×p [v|ht, s] < Eπ [v|ht] ,∀π, p
=⇒ min
π,p




Proof of Proposition 3.2.2
Proof. Let some equilibrium (x, σ,Π) be given. Note that, by Remark 3.2.1,
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u (v − a∗t ) |ht, s̄] ≤ 0 =⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u (v − a∗t ) |ht, s] < 0,∀s < s̄
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u (b∗t − v) |ht, s] ≤ 0 =⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)











Ep×π [u (v − a∗t ) |ht, s̄] ≤ 0, and
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u (b∗t − v) |ht, s] ≤ 0,
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t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0 ∀st ∈ S
satisfy the equilibrium condition, hence a∗t and b
∗
t are a pair of equilibrium prices
given history ht, then ζt(h
x
t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st ∈ S. Therefore, there is an
informational cascade by its denition.
(Only if side.) If there is an informational cascade, then by Lemma (3.2.1) it must
be the case that ζt(h
x
t , st) = ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0, ∀st ∈ S. Then, note that for any π ∈ Π(ht)









and similarly, Pr (v|zt = −1, ht; π) = π(v), for all v ∈ V . So the equilibrium price
would be, by Proposition 3.2.1,
at(ht) = max
π,p





and similarly bt(ht) = b
∗
t . Moreover, it is easy to check that
ζt(h
x
t , s) = 0, ∀s
=⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u (v − a∗t ) |ht, s] ≤ 0, ∀s
=⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)




Ep×π [u (b∗t − v) |ht, s] ≤ 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.2











Ep×π [v|ht, s̄] ≤ a∗t
=⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [(v − a∗t ) |ht, s̄] ≤ 0
=⇒ min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)




Ep×π [(v − a∗t ) |ht, s̄]
]
≤ u(0) = 0,
by Jensen's inequality and Assumption 1. And suciency of inequality (3.2.7) is
analogous.
Proof of Proposition 3.2.3
First, we show a lemma.
Lemma C.1.3. Given any equilibrium, it is impossible to have ζt(h
x
t , s) > 0 or
ιt(h
x
t , s̄) > 0 for any history ht in equilibrium.
Proof. I will show ιt(h
x
t , s̄) > 0 here and the other is similar. Suppose that ιt(h
x
t , s̄) >
0, for contradiction, then
min
p∈P,π∈Πt(ht)
Ep×π [u(bt − v)|ht, s̄] ≥ 0
=⇒ bt ≥ max
π,p
Eπ×p [v|ht, s̄] .
However, by Proposition 3.2.1,
bt = min
π,p






Ep×π [v|ht, s̄] ≤ bt,





Pr(zt = −1|ht, v′)
Pr(zt = −1|ht, v′)
,
for all v′ > v, and hence, a contradiction.
Proof of the proposition
Proof. Then, by the above lemma, in equilibrium (x, σ,Π), given any ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π),
note that one of the following cases must hold:
(i) ζt(h
x
t , st) = 0 and ιt(h
x
t , st) = 0 for all st ∈ S (informational cascade); or
(ii) There exists some s < s∗ ≤ s̄ such that ζt(hxt , s∗) > 0 and ζt(hxt , s) = 0 for all
s < s∗; or
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(iii) There exists some s ≤ s∗ < s̄ such that ιt(hxt , s∗) > 0 and ιt(hxt , s) = 0 for all
s > s∗,
and (ii) and (iii) can hold simultaneously with s∗ ≤ s∗.
Then we prove the statement by cases.
If it is case (i), then Π(ht) must not be a singleton, therefore, at(ht) = maxπ E
π [v|ht] ≥
minπ E
π [v|ht] = bt(ht) and if maxπ Eπ [v|ht] = minπ Eπ [v|ht], it would be contradic-
tory to Theorem 3.2.2.
If it is other cases, then, it suce to show that Pr (v|ht, zt = 1) strictly FSOD
Pr (v|ht, zt = −1) by showing that in each case
Pr (zt = 1|ht, v′)
Pr (zt = 1|ht, v)
>
Pr (zt = −1|ht, v′)
Pr (zt = −1|ht, v)
,




Ep×π [v|ht, zt = 1]
> max
π,p
Ep×π [v|ht, zt = −1]
≥ min
π,p
Ep×π [v|ht, zt = −1]
= bt(ht).
Proof of Corollary 3.2.1
Proof. Note that if there is an informational cascade after history ht, rst, then it
must be that minπ∈Π(ht) E
π [v|ht] < maxπ∈Π(ht) Eπ [v|ht]; second, Πt+1(ht+1) = Πt(ht)
since we can show that
Pr (v|ht, zt = 1;π, p) = Pr (v|ht, zt = 1;π, p) = π(v).
And by induction Π(hτ ) = Π(ht) for all τ ≥ t and hτ ∈ Hτ (x, σ,Π). And the corollary
then is an implication of Proposition 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.3





t , st) strictly positive for any history ht ∈ Ht(x, σ,Π), t ≥ 1, and private
signal st ∈ S.
Proof. Let's x some t, history ht, and signal st. Suppose, for contradiction, ζt(h
x
t , st) >
0 and ιt(h
x
t , st) > 0, it implies, by optimality, that
min
π,p
Eπ×p [u(v − at)|ht, st] = min
π,p
Eπ×p [u(bt − v)|ht, st] ≥ 0,
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and by Jensen's inequality,
min
π,p




Eπ×p [u(v − at)|ht, st]
]
≥ u−1(0) = 0,










Eπ×p [v|ht, st] ≥ min
π,p
Eπ×p [v|ht, st] ≥ at.
But, by Proposition 3.2.3, at < bt , and hence a contradiction.
Proof of the Theorem
Proof. See Proof of Proposition 3.2.3 and Lemma C.1.4.
Proof of the Proposition 3.3.1.
Proof. First, we show the second part of the proposition regarding the prices and
trading decisions in the equilibrium.
I claim that it cannot be the following cases at any history in equilibrium:
(i) ẑt(h
x










t , 0) = 0 or ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0.
Proof. (For the claim). For (i) there would be three cases:
(1) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1
(2) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 0
(3) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1
For (1), suppose, for contradiction, that there exist such a history ht, then the
market maker's zero prot condition would be:
1− η
3
(at(ht)− πt) + η (at(ht)− πt) = 0
1− η
3
(πt − bt(ht)) = 0,
which implies that at(ht) = bt(ht) = πt. Then,
ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 =⇒ π
(0)







πt(1− q) + (1− πt)q
< πt
given that q > 1/2, a contradiction. Proofs are similar for (2) and (3).
For (ii) there would be three cases:
(1) ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
(2) ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = −1
(3) ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 0 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = −1.




(at(ht)− πt) + η [πt(1− q) (at(ht)− 1) + (1− πt)qat(ht)] = 0 (C.1.1)
1− η
3





πt + πt(1− q)
1−η
3η
+ πt(1− q) + (1− πt)q




t , 0) = 1 =⇒ π
(0)
t ≥ at(ht),
a contradiction. Proofs are similar for (1) and (3).
For (iii), suppose, for contradiction, there exists such a history ht that ẑt(h
x
t , 0) =
0. Then, by (i) and (ii), it implies that ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 1.
Then, the market maker's conditions are
1− η
3














πt(1− q) + (1− πt)q
< πt = bt(ht),
given that q > 1/2, a contradiction. The argument for non-possibility of ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0
will be similar.
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Therefore, for any history ht in equilibrium, we will have ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1 and ẑt(hxt , 1) =
1. Then, in this case, the market maker's zero prot conditions are
1− η
3
(at(ht)− πt) + η [πtq (at(ht)− 1) + (1− πt)(1− q)at(ht)] = 0
1− η
3
(πt − bt(ht)) + η [πt(1− q) (1− bt(ht))− (1− πt)qbt(ht)] = 0,







+ πtq + (1− πt)(1− q)




πt + πt(1− q)
1−η
3η
+ πt(1− q) + (1− πt)q
∈ (π(0)t , πt),
apparently, then we have π
(0)
t < bt(ht) < πt < at(ht) < π
(1)
t as desired.
For the existence of equilibrium, rst, the trading strategy is comparing the
updated belief with the ask and bid prices, and pricing strategies as specied by
equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) in each period and given any public belief. We can
verify that, given such at(·) and bt(·), zt(hxt , 1) = 1 and zt(hxt , 0) = −1 as prescribed
by the trading strategies. Therefore, at(ht) and bt(ht) need to satisfy the zero prot
conditions (C.1.1) and (C.1.2), and it is true since equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2)
are equivalent to zero prot conditions. And as long as we have beliefs to be
consistent (w.r.t. the specied strategies), the existence of the equilibrium will then
be established.
To look at the belief updating, under the above specied strategies, and at the
end of period 1, given π1, and a1, b1 determined by the strategy, and z1 records the
trading order at period 1, then
π2(h2) = Pr(v = 1|h2)
=
Pr(v = 1, h2)
Pr(h1)
=




Pr(z1|v = 1)π1 + Pr(z1|v = 0)(1− π1)
At the end of period t > 1, given ht,πt(ht), and at, bt, zt,
πt+1(ht+1) =
Pr(zt|ht, v = 1)πt(ht)
Pr(zt|ht, v = 1)πt(ht) + Pr(zt|ht, v = 0) [1− πt(ht)]
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Note that at any history ht, the conditional probabilities of a buy is








and conditional probability of a sell is








The last step is simply to verify that the specied strategy at(·), bt(·), ẑt and belief
system {πt} satisfy the conditions to be an equilibrium, which is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2
Proof. To prove the lemma, we will show that none of the following is possible for
any history ht in equilibrium:
(i) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 or ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1;
(ii) ẑt(h
x





t , 1) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 0; or
(iv) ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0 and ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1.
The idea of proving non-possibility of these four cases are similar. We compute
the ask and bid price under each case, then conclude it with some contradiction.
For case (i), from market maker's conditions
ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 =⇒ at(ht) = π̄t and bt(ht) = πt,
but, from the informed agent's decision,
ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 =⇒ at(ht) < π
(0)
t < πt,
a contradiction. Proof for the case of ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = −1 is similar.
For case (ii), There would several cases: ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0; ẑt(h
x
t , 0) =
1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = −1; ẑt(hxt , 0) = 0 and ẑt(hxt , 1) = −1. The proofs would be similar,
and we will only prove the case ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 and ẑt(h
x
t , 1) = 0.
From market maker's conditions
ẑt(h
x
t , 0) = 1 =⇒ at(ht) =
γπ̄t + π̄t(1− q)
γ + π̄t(1− q) + (1− π̄t)q
∈ (π̄(0)t , π̄t),
but from the informed agent's decision,
ẑt(h
x









































Proof of Proposition 3.3.5
Proof. Note that (ii) and (iii) is just Proposition 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. So the proof focuses
on (i). Fix an equilibrium and a history ht in equilibrium, let Πt(ht) be given as well.
(Only if side). Given some equilibrium and history ht in equilibrium and ζt(h
x
t , 1), ιt(h
x
t , 0) ∈










(πt − bt(ht)) + ηιt [πt(1− q) (1− bt(ht))− (1− πt)qbt(ht)] = 0,
where ζt is short for ζt(h
x
t , 1) and ιt is short for ιt(h
x
t , 0), and it yields that
at(ht) =
π̄tγ/ζt + π̄tq
γ/ζt + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
bt(ht) =
πtγ/ιt + πt(1− q)
γ/ιt + πt(1− q)− (1− πt)q
.
Moreover, from the trading strategy, see Proposition ??, ζt(h
x
t , 1), ιt(h
x


























1− q + γ/ζt
q + γ/ζt
=





is strictly increasing in γ, it implies that ζt = ιt = σ for some σ. That
is as an implication of the symmetry in the assumptions, the probability of buying









1− q + γ/σ
q + γ/σ
=











there exist a unique σ(ht) such that it solves
r(ht) =









, which is equivalent to (3.3.13). Therefore, this tells us that if
the informed traders are playing the strict mixed strategies, then (3.3.13) must hold.
(If side). We will only show that at(ht) = π
(1)




Suppose, for contradiction, at(ht) > π
(1)
t . Then, from the trading strategy, ζt(h
x
t , 1) =






1−q , a contradiction.
Suppose, for contradiction, at(ht) < π
(1)
t . Then, from the trading strategy, ζt(h
x
t , 1) =
1. Then, by market maker's condition,
at(ht) =
π̄tγ + π̄tq


















Proof of Proposition 3.3.7
Proof. The only if sides in each case are implications of Proposition 3.3.5 and 3.3.6.
We show the if side of case (i) and the proofs for others are similar.
Let inequality (3.3.8) hold. If we set
at(ht) <
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
,








+ ηζt(ht, at, bt, st)
)
(at − v) |ht
]
is then strictly increasing in at, hence it must be strictly less than 0, contradictory to
the zero min-expected prot condition. Hence, it must be such that
at(ht) ≥
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
.
Similar argument applies so that it must be the case that
bt ≤
πtγ + πt(1− q)
γ + πt(1− q)− (1− πt)q
.
But if we set
at(ht) >
π̄tγ + π̄tq
γ + π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)
> π̄t,
then there will be two cases sine inequality (3.3.8) implies that π
(1)
t > π̄t. One
is that at(ht) ≤ π(1)t , again, the informed agent's decision is not changing and the
min-expected prot of a buy is then strictly increasing in at, hence it must be
strictly greater than 0. The other case is that at(ht) > π
(1)
t , then no informed traders
will buy even with a good signal, however, then the min-expected prot of a buy is
1−η
3
[at(ht)− π̄t] > 0. So both cases are contradictory to the zero min-expected prot
condition. And apply the similar argument, we shall see the impossibility of
bt <
πtγ + πt(1− q)
γ + πt(1− q)− (1− πt)q
.
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Therefore, at(ht) and bt(ht) have to be that as stated in the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1




t] and Πt(ht) = [πt, π̄t] be given and Π
′
t(ht) is more ambigu-
ous than Πt(ht). Note that, in equilibrium, ζt(h
x
t , 1) = ιt(h
x
t , 0) = σ. Π
′
t(ht) is more




Then, I claim that σ is weakly decreasing in π̄t(1−πt)πt(1−π̄t)
. Denote ζ ′t(h
x




t , 0) =



































. It is trivial to show σ′ ≤ σ in the rst four cases. So let's focus


















is strictly decreasing in σ. Therefore, σ′ ≤ σ.
For the ask prices, note that since π(γ+qσ)





γ + [π̄′tq + (1− π̄′t)(1− q)]σ′
≥ π̄t(γ + qσ)
γ + [π̄tq + (1− π̄t)(1− q)]σ
= at(ht),
where the inequality holds due to that π̄′t ≥ π̄t and σ′ ≤ σ and the inequality is strict
if π̄′t > π̄t. Similarly, b
′
t(ht) ≤ bt(ht) with strict inequality if π′t < πt.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2






for all t = 1, 2, . . . by mathematical induction. We know that it is true when t = 1


































1− q̄ + γ











































1− q̄ + γ/σ























1−q − ε if zt 6= 0 for all t = 1, . . . , Tε.
162
Then, we can show that for t ≥ Tε large enough, say t̄
Pr
(∣∣∣∣ π̄t(1− πt)πt(1− π̄t) − q1− q





































(∣∣∣∣ π̄t(1− πt)πt(1− π̄t) − q1− q
∣∣∣∣ > ε) <∞,
so we can conclude the almost sure convergence.
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